Are there documented cases where defendants were prosecuted solely for possession of AI‑generated CSAM with no evidence of distribution, production, or real‑child imagery?

1. What the existing prosecutions actually look like

Publicized federal actions repeatedly involve production or distribution allegations, or rely on links between synthetic images and real victims: the Justice Department’s indictment in the Western District of Wisconsin charged production, distribution, and possession tied to AI‑generated images and related transfers to a minor ^[1], and the FBI’s reporting of the Charlotte case notes prosecutors secured possession charges because the AI images were based on real minors and the probe uncovered additional real CSAM and recordings ^[2]. Those examples demonstrate that prosecutors so far have not rested prosecutions on isolated, purely private possession of wholly synthetic imagery without other aggravating evidence ^{[1] [2]}.

2. A judicial check: a district judge found limits to prosecuting private possession

A federal district judge in Wisconsin dismissed a charge of possession of obscene material where the imagery was AI‑generated, ruling that in some circumstances private possession of obscene AI‑CSAM may be constitutionally protected under existing caselaw while allowing other charges to proceed—an outcome now under appeal that underscores judicial skepticism about stretching possession statutes to reach purely private AI creation or storage absent other elements ^{[3] [4]}. TechPolicy.Press’s analysis of that opinion emphasizes the distinction between child obscenity statutes (which can cover nonexistent minors) and traditional CSAM laws, and warns that prosecutors are likely to rely on alternative statutes if pure possession proves constitutionally vulnerable ^[4].

3. Why prosecutors have alternative tools and why that matters

Legal analyses and advocacy organizations document that federal statutes and prosecutorial practice give authorities multiple levers—production, transportation, distribution, transfer, and obscenity counts—that they can use when AI is implicated, and that federal law treats indistinguishable or real‑victim‑based AI content severely ^{[5] [6]}. As a result, reporting shows prosecutors prefer charging theories tied to conduct (creating, sharing, or using images of real victims) rather than testing a novel, standalone possession theory of purely synthetic files; commentators and civil‑society groups likewise push statutory clarification to close perceived gaps, which further channels enforcement toward production/distribution frameworks ^{[6] [7]}.

4. Gaps, evolving law, and reporting limitations

Available sources repeatedly caution that the law is still evolving, that courts have not universally resolved whether private possession of purely AI‑generated CSAM is prosecutable, and that many state statutes vary—meaning the absence of documented standalone possession prosecutions in reporting is informative but not dispositive for every jurisdiction ^{[8] [9]}. Industry, advocacy, and state attorney general statements assert aggressive treatment of AI CSAM ^[10], but those public stances do not equate to a recorded case where possession alone—untethered to production, distribution, or real‑child imagery—led to conviction; the reporting catalogues prosecutions that either include production/distribution counts or rely on images traceable to real minors ^{[1] [2] [9]}.

5. Bottom line and how this could change

In short, the reporting does not document a clear instance of prosecution and conviction based solely on possession of AI‑generated CSAM with no evidence of production, distribution, or real‑child imagery; instead, prosecutors have used other statutes or shown connections to real victims, and at least one judge has limited a pure possession theory in the AI context—though legislative changes and appellate rulings could change the landscape and create new precedents ^{[1] [2] [3] [4]}.