Is it true that Right-wing extremists are responsible for most extremist-related murders over the last decade Left-wing extremism 4% Other 1% Domestic Islamist extremism 18% Right-wing extremism 77%

1. Summary of the results

The data presented in the original statement appears to be largely accurate based on multiple analyses, though the picture is more complex than the simple percentages suggest. Multiple sources confirm that right-wing extremist violence has been responsible for approximately 75% to 80% of U.S. domestic terrorism deaths since 2001 ^[1]. This strongly supports the claim that right-wing extremism accounts for 77% of extremist-related murders over the last decade.

However, recent trends show a significant shift in 2025. While right-wing attacks have historically been more lethal, there has been a notable drop in right-wing terror incidents in 2025, with left-wing attacks increasing substantially ^[2]. Specifically, there were 5 left-wing incidents in the first half of 2025, putting the year on pace to be the left's most violent in over three decades ^[2]. Some sources indicate that left-wing attacks are outnumbering those from the far right for the first time in more than 30 years ^[3].

Despite this recent uptick in left-wing incidents, the lethality gap remains stark. Right-wing attacks have resulted in 112 fatalities in the past decade compared to just 13 from left-wing attacks ^[2]. This suggests that while left-wing attacks may be increasing in frequency, right-wing extremism continues to be far more deadly in terms of actual casualties.

Research indicates that radical acts by left-wing causes are less likely to be violent, while right-wing and Islamist extremists show no difference in violence levels ^[4]. This behavioral difference helps explain why the fatality statistics remain so heavily skewed toward right-wing extremism despite recent changes in incident frequency.

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

The original statement lacks several crucial pieces of context that significantly impact interpretation. First, the timeframe matters enormously - while the decade-long statistics support the claim, the dramatic shift in 2025 suggests the landscape of domestic terrorism is rapidly evolving ^{[2] [3]}.

The statement also fails to acknowledge the subjective nature of categorizing political violence. As noted by analysts, assessing political violence in America involves inherent subjectivity, and individual incidents may not be representative of broader trends ^[5]. The killing of Charlie Kirk, for instance, may not reflect wider patterns of radical-left violence ^[5].

International perspectives are completely absent from the original data. The UK's MI5 describes a more diffuse extreme right-wing threat where individuals form loose networks, often online, suggesting that the nature of right-wing extremism is evolving globally ^[6]. This evolution could impact how we categorize and count incidents.

The statement also ignores cognitive biases in terrorism perception. Research highlights how false narratives persist - specifically that "terrorists are always Muslim" and "white people are never terrorists" - which are rooted in unconscious biases and white privilege ^[7]. These biases may affect both data collection and public perception of the statistics presented.

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

While the core statistics appear accurate, the presentation contains several potential sources of bias. The clean percentage breakdown (77% right-wing, 18% Islamist, 4% left-wing, 1% other) suggests a level of precision that may be misleading given the subjective nature of categorizing political violence ^[5].

The statement presents static historical data without acknowledging recent dramatic shifts. By focusing solely on decade-long averages, it obscures the fact that 2025 represents a potential inflection point where left-wing violence is experiencing unprecedented growth ^{[2] [3]}. This temporal bias could mislead readers about current threat levels.

The framing also potentially suffers from definitional bias. Different organizations may categorize the same incident differently, and the boundaries between "right-wing," "left-wing," and "other" extremism can be subjective. The research suggesting that datasets available indicate radical-left violence is not broadly on the rise ^[5] conflicts with other sources showing recent increases, highlighting how different methodologies can yield different conclusions.

Finally, the statement lacks acknowledgment of evolving threat patterns. The description of extreme right-wing threats as increasingly diffuse with loose online networks ^[6] suggests that traditional counting methods may not capture the full scope of contemporary extremist activity, potentially skewing the statistical picture presented in the original claim.