What percentage of US domestic terrorism incidents are attributed to right-wing extremism?

1. Summary of the results

Based on the analyses provided, right-wing extremism has historically dominated US domestic terrorism, accounting for approximately 75% to 80% of domestic terrorism deaths since 2001 ^[1]. This statistic represents a consistent finding across multiple sources and establishes right-wing extremism as the predominant form of domestic terrorism in terms of both frequency and lethality over the past two decades.

However, 2025 marked a significant shift in this pattern. For the first time in over 30 years, left-wing terrorist attacks outnumbered those from the violent far right ^[2]. This dramatic change saw right-wing terrorism plunge dramatically in the first half of 2025, with only one incident recorded, while left-wing attacks experienced an uptick ^[3]. Despite this reversal in frequency, the analyses emphasize that left-wing violence remains much lower than historical levels of violence carried out by right-wing and jihadist attackers ^[3].

The lethality differential remains stark between the two forms of extremism. Left-wing attacks have typically been less lethal than right-wing ones, with only two fatalities recorded since 2020 ^[3]. This suggests that while the frequency of incidents may have shifted in 2025, the overall threat assessment continues to favor right-wing extremism as the more dangerous form of domestic terrorism.

Law enforcement perspectives align with these data trends. Top U.S. law enforcement officials identify far-right extremist movements as the biggest domestic terrorism threat facing the country ^[4], reinforcing the assessment that right-wing violence represents law enforcement's top domestic terrorism concern despite recent changes in incident frequency.

2. Missing context/alternative viewpoints

The analyses reveal several important contextual elements that provide a more nuanced understanding of domestic terrorism patterns. Left-wing terrorism is specifically defined as terrorism motivated by opposition to capitalism, imperialism, or colonialism ^[2], which helps clarify the ideological boundaries of this classification.

A critical missing element is the effectiveness and organizational capacity of different extremist groups. The analyses indicate that left-wing incidents often have limited effectiveness due to factors such as target selection and lack of organization ^[2]. This organizational weakness may explain why left-wing terrorism, despite increasing in frequency during 2025, continues to produce fewer casualties.

The temporal context is crucial for understanding these statistics. While the 75-80% figure represents data since 2001, the dramatic shift in 2025 suggests that historical patterns may not predict future trends. The analyses don't provide sufficient explanation for why right-wing terrorism declined so dramatically in 2025, leaving questions about whether this represents a temporary fluctuation or a more permanent shift.

Another missing perspective concerns the role of jihadist terrorism, which is mentioned alongside right-wing terrorism in historical comparisons ^[3] but isn't thoroughly analyzed in relation to the overall domestic terrorism landscape. This omission may affect the complete picture of domestic terrorism attribution percentages.

3. Potential misinformation/bias in the original statement

The original question, while straightforward, contains an implicit assumption that may lead to oversimplified understanding. By asking for a single percentage attribution to right-wing extremism, the question doesn't account for the significant temporal variations that the analyses reveal, particularly the dramatic shift that occurred in 2025.

The question also doesn't distinguish between incident frequency and lethality, which the analyses show can diverge significantly. A focus solely on incident percentages might understate the disproportionate impact of right-wing terrorism in terms of casualties and deaths, potentially creating a misleading impression of relative threat levels.

Furthermore, the question's framing doesn't acknowledge the definitional complexities involved in categorizing domestic terrorism. The analyses suggest that different methodologies and definitions might yield different percentages, and the question doesn't specify whether it seeks data on incidents, deaths, or overall threat assessment.

The recency bias in available data also presents potential issues. While the 75-80% figure covers the period since 2001, the dramatic changes in 2025 demonstrate how quickly these patterns can shift, suggesting that any single percentage figure may quickly become outdated or misleading without proper temporal context.