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Fact check: How many right-wing extremist-related murders occurred in the US in 2022?
Executive Summary
The Anti-Defamation League’s (ADL) Center on Extremism documented that 25 ideologically motivated murders occurred in the United States in 2022 and that all were committed by right-wing extremists, with 21 of those killings linked to white supremacists, a decline from 33 extremist-related murders in 2021. This finding is the central statistic reported across ADL summaries and media coverage in early 2023 and is the most-cited quantitative estimate for 2022 extremist-related homicides [1] [2]. Alternative commentary notes that assessing political violence involves interpretive choices, but does not dispute the ADL’s count as its published dataset.
1. Why the ADL’s 25-number dominates coverage — clarity and limits
The ADL’s 2023 report is the primary origin of the widely cited figure that 25 people were killed in extremist-related incidents in 2022, all by right-wing actors; multiple summaries and press pieces restate that total consistently [1] [2]. The ADL provides granularity — identifying that 21 of the 25 were linked to white supremacists and noting a fall from 33 murders in 2021 — which makes the dataset attractive to journalists and researchers seeking a clear year-to-year comparison [1]. The ADL frames its work as a counting exercise based on publicly known incidents and investigative follow-up rather than an official law-enforcement tally, which matters for interpretation.
2. How the ADL counts incidents and why methodology matters
The ADL’s count arises from its Center on Extremism’s tracking of domestic ideologically motivated killings visible in public records and reporting, with classification decisions about motive and affiliation that produce the “right-wing” label [1]. These methodological choices — for example, whether to include solo actors motivated by racial ideology or to count incidents where motive is ambiguous — determine the final tally; the ADL reports specific linkages to white supremacist ideology in most cases [1]. Understanding the ADL’s operational definitions is essential because other datasets might apply broader or narrower criteria, leading to different totals and interpretations.
3. Independent commentary and caution about broader trends
Analysts and commentators have urged caution about extrapolating a single-year ADL count into claims about long-term trends in political violence; the Economist noted that assessing political violence is “inherently subjective” and that single incidents do not necessarily indicate broader shifts, even as available datasets point to asymmetric threats [3]. That commentary does not dispute the ADL’s 2022 figures but emphasizes interpretive context: the ADL’s 25 figure is a snapshot that must be read alongside longer-term data and different methodological approaches to understand whether violence is increasing, decreasing, or concentrating in certain forms.
4. What “right-wing” and “white supremacist” labels mean in practice
The ADL’s classification that all 25 murders were committed by right-wing extremists, and that 21 involved white supremacist linkages, rests on evidence linking perpetrators’ stated beliefs, affiliations, or symbols to an extremist ideology [1]. This approach highlights that racially motivated or supremacist ideologies accounted for the majority of documented extremist homicides in 2022, but it does not imply a monolithic movement; incidents range from lone actors to organized networks and involve varied tactical contexts. Readers should note the distinction between ideological labeling for analytic clarity and legal or prosecutorial definitions used in criminal cases.
5. Diverging emphases across outlets and potential agendas
Coverage repeating the ADL number tends to emphasize a rising domestic far-right threat and the centrality of white supremacist violence [2] [4]. Commentary that stresses the subjectivity of violence measurement may reflect a cautionary or skeptical agenda aimed at preventing overgeneralization [3]. Both perspectives use the same core ADL data: one highlights the pattern of right-wing culpability, the other warns against concluding broader political violence trends based solely on isolated high-profile killings. Identifying those emphases clarifies how the same dataset supports different narratives.
6. How year-to-year changes should be read
The ADL notes a decline from 33 extremist-related murders in 2021 to 25 in 2022, a numerical decrease that remains significant given the concentrated role of right-wing actors [1]. Year-to-year volatility is common in small-count phenomena: a single mass-casualty event can materially alter annual totals. Analysts must therefore combine single-year counts with multi-year patterns to assess whether policy responses or threat environments are changing substantively. The ADL’s numbers provide an important data point for such longitudinal study while underscoring the need for multiple datasets.
7. Bottom line for the original question and next steps
Answering the question directly: the ADL’s documented count is 25 right-wing extremist-related murders in the U.S. in 2022, with 21 linked to white supremacists, a finding reported across ADL releases and media summaries in February–March 2023 [1] [2]. To deepen analysis, consult multiple datasets and official law-enforcement records where available and examine the ADL’s methodology appendix to see classification rules; doing so will reveal how definitional choices shape counts and what the numbers imply for policy, prevention, and public understanding.