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Which state constitutions mention or prohibit foreign or religious laws, and how do those provisions differ from Sharia bans?
Executive summary
Several U.S. states have adopted provisions that mention or bar “foreign” or “religious” laws — often prompted by concerns about Sharia — but courts and civil-rights groups have repeatedly challenged such measures as unnecessary or discriminatory [1] [2]. Federal law and constitutional doctrine limit states’ ability to regulate foreign-relations matters and already ensure that no religious law may override U.S. federal or state law, which complicates the practical need for explicit “Sharia bans” [3] [4].
1. What state constitutions and statutes actually say — plain language vs. phrasing
Several state measures explicitly named “Sharia” or broadly prohibited “foreign” or “religious” laws; Oklahoma’s 2010 ballot amendment is the oft-cited example that named Sharia alongside “international” law, and other states later used either specific naming or neutral “foreign law” language in statutes and constitutional text [1] [5]. Reporting and legal guides document many state proposals and enacted statutes over the last decade-plus that either single out Sharia or use broader phrasing to avoid explicit religious targeting [6] [5].
2. How those provisions differ from a pure “Sharia ban” in practice
Some states used explicit Sharia language; others rewrote measures to bar any foreign or religious law that conflicts with state public policy — a neutral formulation intended to withstand constitutional scrutiny [5] [7]. The practical difference is that a law framed as a general prohibition on foreign or religious laws aims to apply evenly to Jewish, Christian, Hindu, or Islamic norms, while explicit Sharia naming singles out Islam and has been viewed by civil-rights groups as discriminatory [1] [5].
3. Legal limits: why federal law and constitutional doctrine matter
Constitutional law assigns foreign-affairs authority to the federal government and recognizes a “dormant” foreign relations power that can render state efforts invalid when they intrude on national foreign policy, so states cannot simply rewrite foreign relations by statute or constitution [3] [4]. Additionally, federal statutes like the Federal Arbitration Act and constitutional protections mean religious arbitration and private dispute resolution already have a legal framework; attempts to categorically ban consideration of religious legal norms can conflict with these principles [5] [8].
4. Court reactions and civil‑rights objections
The American Civil Liberties Union and federal courts have successfully challenged and blocked measures that singled out Sharia for discriminative treatment, with courts noting lack of evidence that state courts had ever applied Sharia in a problematic way and finding discriminatory intent in some measures [2] [1]. The ACLU’s litigation against Oklahoma’s amendment produced rulings that explain courts will scrutinize whether bans are solving a real legal problem or merely singling out a religious minority [2] [1].
5. Policy arguments from competing sides
Proponents argue explicit or broad bans protect constitutional values and prevent foreign or religious norms that would violate civil‑rights guarantees from being applied in U.S. courts [9] [10]. Opponents — including civil‑liberties organizations and many legal scholars — contend bans are unnecessary because existing constitutional safeguards prevent foreign or religious laws from superseding constitutional rights, and that bans often stigmatize Muslim communities and risk invalidating routine private agreements or arbitration awards [8] [1].
6. The record on “need” and real-world effects
Courts and commentators have noted the absence of systemic instances where Sharia law displaced U.S. state or federal law; the Oklahoma litigation record includes a finding that proponents could not identify a single concrete example that the amendment remedied [2]. Legal analyses warn that overly broad bans could have unintended consequences — for example, undermining enforceability of religiously informed arbitration agreements or interstate legal determinations — because foreign or religious norms sometimes inform private settlements and contracts recognized under the Federal Arbitration Act [5] [8].
7. Takeaway for readers: distinctions that matter
The crucial distinctions are (a) whether a measure names “Sharia” (explicitly religious and hence more vulnerable to discrimination claims) or uses neutral “foreign/religious law” language, and (b) whether the law actually fills a legal gap or simply signals political opposition to a religion. Federal constitutional limits on state action in foreign affairs and existing statutory frameworks already constrain how far states can and should go [3] [4] [1].
Limitations: available sources document state measures, federal legal doctrines, and litigation but do not provide a comprehensive list of every state constitutional text or every post-2015 statutory amendment; for a complete inventory of current state constitutions and exact wording, consult the cited constitution repositories and state statutes referenced in the legal research guides [11] [12].