What precedent exists for states using sanctions to impede international judicial bodies?
Executive summary
The clearest precedent for a state using sanctions to impede an international judicial body is the United States’ campaign against the International Criminal Court (ICC), which began with asset freezes and visa restrictions in 2020 and escalated through legislation and executive orders in the 2000s and again in 2025 [1] [2] [3]. These measures—ranging from the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act to targeted sanctions on prosecutors and judges—have been framed by Washington as defense of national sovereignty while prompting widespread legal and diplomatic pushback from courts, states parties and human-rights groups [2] [4] [5].
1. The first concrete example: Trump-era sanctions on ICC staff in 2020
In September 2020 the U.S. imposed sanctions on ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and a senior official, coupling asset freezes with visa restrictions and marking what Human Rights Watch called an unprecedented use of sanctions against international court officials [1] [6]. The Trump administration defended the step as protecting U.S. personnel from what it described as overreach by the ICC, while ICC member states, bar associations and NGOs condemned the measures as coercive and harmful to victims’ access to justice [1] [6] [7].
2. Legislative and statutory tools that paved the way: ASPA and beyond
The United States had earlier created legal tools aimed at deterring ICC jurisdiction: the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002 expressly sought to protect U.S. officials from ICC prosecution and authorized a spectrum of countermeasures, signaling a long-standing policy posture that later enabled sanctions and other restrictions [2]. That statute, coupled with executive authorities invoked in 2020 and 2025, demonstrates how domestic law can be used to institutionalize pressure on international judicial mechanisms [2] [3].
3. Escalation and normalization in 2025: EO 14203 and designations of judges
In early 2025 President Trump signed Executive Order 14203 authorizing fresh sanctions on ICC personnel and instructing further designations, and the State Department later sanctioned multiple ICC judges for their roles in investigations involving the U.S. and Israel—moves described in reportage as the first time U.S. sanctions targeted sitting international judges [3] [8] [9]. Washington characterized these steps as responses to what it called politicization of the Court, while critics warned the measures impede judicial independence and obstruct accountability [10] [7].
4. Effects documented and legal-political responses
Sanctions have practical bite—asset freezes, denied access to U.S. financial systems and travel bans—that advocates say have hindered ICC operations and chilled cooperation, and have spurred litigation in U.S. courts as well as calls by states parties to protect the Court [4] [11]. International bodies and rights organizations framed U.S. coercion as a threat to collective justice mechanisms and urged coordinated mitigation by member states, while some legal commentators flagged possible avenues for affected states to challenge the measures under international dispute mechanisms [5] [12].
5. What this precedent tells us — and what remains uncertain
The record assembled in reporting shows a distinct, recent precedent: a major power using domestic sanctions law and executive orders to target an international judicial institution and its personnel, backed by long-standing congressional statutes [1] [2] [3]. Sources do not provide comparable, well-documented examples of other states employing identical tactics against international courts, so it cannot be asserted from this reporting that comparable precedents exist beyond the U.S.–ICC pattern; observers differ on whether the U.S. approach will remain an anomaly or inspire similar coercive practices by others [13] [7].