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What Supreme Court rulings define the duty to disobey illegal military orders (e.g., Yamashita, Parker, Marcum)?
Executive summary
The provided search results show U.S. Supreme Court discussion of military commissions and reviewability in In re Yamashita [1] and several unrelated “Parker” and “Marcum” items from state courts or different contexts; none of the supplied sources lay out a clear Supreme Court doctrine that creates a free‑standing duty for service members to disobey illegal orders (Yamashita is focused on jurisdiction and trial procedures for military commissions) [2][3][4]. Available sources do not mention a unified set of Supreme Court rulings named “Parker” or “Marcum” that define an obligation to disobey unlawful military orders; the Parker entries returned are different cases and Marcum in the results is an Indiana state criminal appeal, not a Supreme Court military‑law decision [5][6][7].
1. Yamashita — what the Supreme Court actually addressed
The Supreme Court’s In re Yamashita decision dealt with the jurisdiction and procedural review of a military commission that tried General Tomoyuki Yamashita for war crimes; the cited discussion emphasizes whether the commission was lawfully constituted and whether the Court could review evidentiary rulings and guilt determinations, not a broad doctrine telling soldiers when they must refuse orders [2][3]. Contemporary commentary and law‑review coverage notes that the majority held the commission was legally established and that this Court’s review power over wartime commissions was limited — the decision focused on commission jurisdiction and due process safeguards rather than articulating a general duty to disobey orders [4].
2. Parker entries — multiple “Parkers,” different legal issues
Search results return several “Parker” opinions across decades and jurisdictions; the Parker v. County of Los Angeles Supreme Court reference is about state employment loyalty tests and due process questions, not military obedience or the law of war [5]. Other Parker decisions in the results (United States v. Parker, Parker v. Richard, People v. Parker) involve disparate civil or criminal issues in 19th‑ and 20th‑century contexts and California state law, so the name alone does not identify a Supreme Court ruling on unlawful military orders [8][9][7].
3. Marcum — state criminal appeal, not a Supreme Court military precedent
The “Chad E. Marcum” result is an Indiana Supreme Court opinion about trial and evidentiary issues in a criminal case; it does not appear to establish any rule about military obedience or a service member’s duty to refuse illegal orders [6]. Available sources do not mention a Supreme Court Marcum opinion that defines when military personnel must disobey orders.
4. What these sources do show — limits on review, due process concerns in wartime
Taken together, the Yamashita materials in the set show the Court was concerned with whether military commissions complied with accepted procedures and whether ordinary judicial review could reach their findings; the opinion stresses procedural protections and the law of war’s requirements for fair trial processes, rather than setting out an affirmative, generalized right or duty for subordinates to disobey specific orders [2][3][4].
5. Not found in current reporting — an explicit Supreme Court “duty to disobey” line of cases
Available sources do not mention a clear, authoritative line of U.S. Supreme Court rulings that codify a bright‑line duty for soldiers to disobey illegal orders named across Yamashita, Parker, and Marcum; the results instead mix distinct cases and jurisdictions (federal Supreme Court, state courts, law review) and do not assemble a unified doctrine [2][5][6].
6. Where researchers should look next for the legal doctrine
To answer whether and how U.S. law imposes a duty to disobey unlawful orders, primary materials that are not in the provided set would be necessary: Uniform Code of Military Justice provisions, Department of Defense and service regulations, and federal appellate or Supreme Court cases that directly analyze the superior‑order defense (available sources do not mention these materials). The present search results do not include UCMJ text, DoD policy, or the commonly cited military law authorities that legal scholars and courts use to analyze obedience to illegal orders [4].
7. Practical takeaway and caveats for readers
From the documents here, Yamashita is best read as a wartime‑commission and due‑process decision rather than a precedent immunizing or imposing obligations of disobedience; the other “Parker” and “Marcum” items in the results are different cases not on point [2][5][6]. For a definitive, actionable statement about when troops must refuse orders, one must consult sources not present in these search results — military statutes, regulations, and targeted case law — because those specifics are not found in the current reporting [4].