What Supreme Court precedent governs loss of U.S. citizenship and how would S.3283 interact with Afroyim v. Rusk and Vance v. Terrazas?
Executive summary
The Supreme Court’s twin precedents governing loss of U.S. citizenship are Afroyim v. Rusk , which forbids involuntary revocation of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Vance v. Terrazas , which layered onto Afroyim the requirement that a citizen intend to relinquish citizenship before it can be lost [1] [2]. A bill like S.3283 that would force dual citizens to “choose or lose” their U.S. citizenship appears to recreate the sort of coerced expatriation Afroyim rejected and would therefore be vulnerable to challenge under Afroyim and the intent doctrine articulated in Terrazas, although some doctrinal questions about evidentiary standards and congressional authority would be litigated [3] [4] [5].
1. Afroyim v. Rusk: the constitutional firewall against involuntary expatriation
In Afroyim the Supreme Court held that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from being stripped of citizenship without their voluntary assent, overturning statutory schemes that automatically revoked nationality for certain acts and establishing that citizenship is “permanent and secure” unless willingly surrendered [1] [4] [6]. The decision grew out of Beys Afroyim’s case, in which the government had relied on a 1940 statute to revoke his citizenship after he voted in an Israeli election; the Court rejected that involuntary doctrine and emphasized that loss requires the citizen’s assent [4] [1].
2. Vance v. Terrazas: intent required, acts alone insufficient
Vance v. Terrazas built on Afroyim by clarifying that an expatriating act alone cannot automatically establish loss of citizenship; the government must prove that the citizen specifically intended to relinquish nationality [2] [5]. The Terrazas opinions stressed that statutory lists of expatriating acts are not conclusive proof of assent and that a factfinder must determine whether the individual formed a conscious intent to abandon U.S. citizenship [2] [7]. Courts and commentators have debated the appropriate burden of proof and the scope of congressional power to define evidentiary standards in these cases, so Terrazas left some doctrinal fog even as it required intent [4] [5].
3. Where S.3283 (the “choose-or-lose” mechanism) collides with precedent
Reporting indicates S.3283 would require dual citizens to renounce other allegiances or face “automatic relinquishment” of U.S. nationality after a deadline—an enforcement design that functions as forced expatriation [3]. Under Afroyim, any statutory scheme that purports to unilaterally strip citizenship without the citizen’s voluntary assent runs a high constitutional risk; a law that imposes an ultimatum and then declares citizenship forfeited for noncompliance plainly resembles the coercive revocations Afroyim condemned [1] [4]. Terrazas adds that loss cannot rest on the statutory classification of conduct alone: even a congressional “choose-or-lose” rule could not bypass the requirement that an individual intended to relinquish U.S. citizenship absent a clear and specific showing of that intent [2] [5].
4. Possible defenses and doctrinal uncertainties S.3283’s sponsors would invoke
Proponents might argue Congress has broad authority to regulate nationality and to condition benefits on sole allegiance, pointing to the long history of congressional expatriation statutes and to language in some cases suggesting Congress can set evidentiary standards in civil nationality proceedings [8] [7]. Terrazas left open contested questions about the proper burden or procedure to establish intent and about how to treat statutory expatriating acts in administrative contexts, and those openings could be the battleground where a court tests a new “choose-or-lose” statute [5] [8].
5. Bottom line and litigation outlook
Given the central holdings of Afroyim and Terrazas—that citizenship cannot be taken involuntarily and that intent to relinquish must be shown—S.3283’s automatic forfeiture mechanism would likely prompt immediate constitutional challenges and face a steep uphill climb in the federal courts unless the law were redesigned to secure unmistakable, voluntary renunciations by the affected individuals [1] [2] [3]. Reporting on the bill flags this tension directly: critics call the bill a form of forced expatriation inconsistent with those Supreme Court precedents, while advocates point to congressional authority over nationality—so the controversy will probably be resolved only through litigation that tests the line Afroyim and Terrazas drew between voluntary renunciation and coercive deprivation [3] [4].