Which Colorado statutes did prosecutors allege Tina Peters violated?

1. What prosecutors alleged — short version

Prosecutors alleged Peters helped enable a man to access secure election‑system software updates and to copy election equipment hard drives, and they framed those acts as criminal under Colorado law: multiple counts of attempting to influence a public servant (felonies), a felony count of conspiracy to commit criminal impersonation, and misdemeanors for official misconduct, violation of duty, and failing to comply with the Secretary of State’s requirements ^{[4] [2] [5]}.

2. The specific Colorado statutes cited in filings

Court documents and appellate filings identify C.R.S. §1‑13‑107^[1] — the statute prosecutors used to allege an official “violated, neglected, or failed to perform [a] duty” — for Count 10 (violation of duty) ^[3]. Count 11 in the same paperwork is tied to C.R.S. §1‑13‑114, alleging interference with or refusal to comply with Secretary of State rules ^[3]. Public reporting summarizing the indictment and convictions then maps those statutory theories onto the criminal labels jurors returned (attempting to influence a public servant; conspiracy to commit criminal impersonation; first‑degree official misconduct; violation of duty; failure to comply with Secretary of State) ^{[4] [2]}.

3. How reporting translates statutes into criminal counts

Local and national outlets report the prosecutors’ case largely by naming the criminal counts the jury convicted on rather than reciting statutory code numbers for every count. Multiple outlets — Associated Press, Colorado Public Radio, Colorado Newsline, Axios and BBC — list the convictions as three counts of attempting to influence a public servant, one count of conspiracy to commit criminal impersonation, first‑degree official misconduct, violation of duty, and failure to comply with an order from the Secretary of State ^{[2] [4] [6] [5] [7]}. The appellate record supplements that reporting by explicitly naming C.R.S. §1‑13‑107^[1] and C.R.S. §1‑13‑114 for the duty and Secretary‑of‑State‑compliance counts ^[3].

4. Where sources agree and where coverage is sparse

Sources uniformly agree on the convictions and the labels of the counts (attempting to influence a public servant; conspiracy to commit criminal impersonation; official misconduct; violation of duty; failure to comply with Secretary of State) ^{[2] [4] [5]}. The appellate filing and court documents provide the clearest linkage to Colorado statutes by naming C.R.S. §1‑13‑107^[1] and C.R.S. §1‑13‑114 for the duty‑related counts ^[3]. Available sources do not mention every statutory subsection linked to the other named criminal labels (for example, the precise Colorado statutory citations for “attempting to influence a public servant,” “conspiracy to commit criminal impersonation,” and “first‑degree official misconduct” are not spelled out in the news summaries provided here) ^{[2] [4] [5] [6]}.

5. Defense claims and competing narratives

Peters’ civil filings and public statements argue she violated “no statute, administrative regulation, rule, or order in existence at any relevant time” when she made and disseminated forensic images, and she framed prosecution as politically motivated and punitive for her speech about elections; she also told the courts she was acting as an elections official and raising election‑integrity concerns ^{[8] [9]}. Prosecutors and the jury, by contrast, concluded her actions amounted to deception and misconduct that compromised election security and violated the statutes and duties imposed on election officials ^{[4] [2]}.

6. Why the statute names matter in practice

C.R.S. §1‑13‑107^[1] is a statute prosecutors used to allege a public official neglected or failed to perform statutory duties — a category that can be charged as official misconduct or violation of duty — and C.R.S. §1‑13‑114 is cited for refusing to comply with Secretary of State directives, a statutory hook for discipline when an elections official disregards state election administration rules ^[3]. Those statutory labels underpin both misdemeanor regulatory counts and the broader narrative prosecutors used to argue the conduct had criminal effect on election security, which is how media outlets summarized the convictions ^{[3] [4] [5]}.

7. Limitations and what’s not in these sources

The provided reporting and filings clearly connect Counts 10 and 11 to C.R.S. §1‑13‑107^[1] and C.R.S. §1‑13‑114 respectively ^[3], and multiple outlets list the criminal counts jurors convicted on ^{[2] [4] [5]}. Available sources do not provide the complete charging document with every statutory citation for each count in the indictment as presented to the grand jury; they also do not reproduce the exact statutory language for the attempting‑to‑influence and impersonation counts within the material supplied here ^{[2] [3]}. If you want the full indictment with line‑by‑line statutory citations, the underlying court complaint and charging documents referenced in the appellate filing would be the next source to obtain ^{[10] [3]}.