What specific files or data were found on Tina Peters' devices or cloud accounts?
Executive summary
Available reporting says investigators seized computer equipment and that Tina Peters retained a copy of Mesa County’s 2020 voting-system data as reported by Dominion; prosecutors argued she provided sensitive election information and images to unauthorized people and that photos and data were later posted online, exposing systems [1] [2] [3]. Specific inventories of files or full cloud-account contents are not detailed in the sources provided [1] [2].
1. What prosecutors and reviewers say was found
Federal and state reporting consistently states that Peters “kept a copy” of Colorado’s 2020 election results as reported by Dominion Voting Systems and that images and data from Mesa County’s voting systems were posted online after unauthorized access; prosecutors tied her to giving sensitive election information to an unauthorized individual [2] [3] [1]. News coverage also reports that investigators seized computer equipment worth an estimated $12,000–$15,000 from the home of a person linked to the case [4].
2. What Peters’ legal team and allies claim
Peters and her attorneys describe her possession of the Dominion-reported files as a lawful preservation of election records and say the copy is “essential” and makes her a material witness to alleged wrongdoing; her lawyer asked for clemency and framed the files as evidence that could show tampering [2] [5]. The Department of Justice review and some allied commentary have reopened debate over how those records should be interpreted [6] [5].
3. What the court record and indictments emphasize
Indictments and trial reporting focus less on granular file-names and more on actions: fraudulent background checks, misuse of an access badge to enter a secure room, photographs taken of machines and associated data, and the posting of those images and data online, which exposed machines to potential hackers and forced equipment replacement [3] [1]. The legal narrative centers on unauthorized disclosure and operational risk rather than listing specific files or cloud directories [3] [1].
4. What the media explicitly does not report (limitations)
Available sources do not publish a detailed inventory of the specific files, filenames, metadata, or cloud-account contents seized from Peters’ devices or associated cloud services; reporting references “a copy” of election data and images but not a forensic catalogue of every file [2] [1] [3]. If you are seeking a precise forensic list—file hashes, export logs, or cloud-folder names—those specifics are not included in the cited coverage [1] [4].
5. Why granular file detail matters and who would have it
Forensic teams and prosecutors ordinarily produce detailed inventories during investigation and discovery; those documents would contain the file-level evidence you’re asking about, but that material is typically part of court filings, discovery packets, or forensic reports that have not been appended to the news stories cited here [1] [3]. Defense teams and federal reviewers might also reference such inventories in motions or appeals, but the publicly cited articles do not reproduce them [2] [6].
6. Competing narratives and implicit agendas
Prosecutors and mainstream outlets frame the evidence as a breach that jeopardized election security and required machine replacement [1] [3]. Peters’ defenders and some conservative outlets portray her possession of data as preservation or whistleblowing and call for clemency or federal review [2] [5]. Each side benefits rhetorically: prosecutors emphasize public safety and law enforcement; allies emphasize transparency and political persecution [1] [2].
7. What to read or request next if you want file-level proof
To move beyond summaries in these news reports, request — or search court dockets for — the discovery exhibits, forensic reports, or the charging documents in the state case and any federal review materials; those sources are where file inventories, screenshots, or logs would appear if released. The stories cited do not include those technical exhibits [1] [6].
Limitations: This analysis uses only the provided reporting and therefore cannot confirm or deny the existence of any file lists, cloud backups, or forensic images beyond what those articles describe; the sources cited do not publish a file-level inventory [2] [1] [3].