What can you tell me about Title 8 U.S.C. § 1357
Executive summary
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1357 is the federal statutory backbone for immigration officers’ field powers—authorizing certain interrogations, arrests, searches, seizures, and oath‑taking in immigration matters—and it also contains the 287(g) mechanism for state and local officers to act under delegated federal authority [1] [2] [3]. Courts and agency guidance have narrowed and clarified how those powers interact with the Fourth Amendment and with limits on warrantless entries, and the statute has been the focal point of recent policy directives and legislative attention [4] [5] [6].
1. What the statute says in plain terms
Section 1357 gives officers and employees of the immigration service, as designated by the Attorney General, authority to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence about a person’s right to be in the United States and "any matter" material to enforcing the immigration laws, language reflected in the statutory text and official codifications [1] [7] [8].
2. The operational powers the statute is commonly read to provide
The statute is the statutory source for routine immigration enforcement powers: interrogating persons believed to be aliens, making arrests, and conducting searches and seizures—often described in Justice Department guidance as authorizing interrogation, arrest, search, and seizure without a warrant in immigration contexts—subject to constitutional restraints [4] [1].
3. 287(g): deputizing state and local officers and liability consequences
Section 1357(g) (often called 287(g)) establishes two avenues by which state and local officers can perform immigration functions under federal supervision and written agreements, and the statute addresses how those officers are treated for purposes of federal liability and immunity when acting under color of such authority [2] [3]. The text and implementing materials treat an officer acting under a valid agreement as acting under federal authority for certain civil‑liability questions [2].
4. Judicial and supervisory limits—warrants, the Fourth Amendment, and interpretation
Although §1357 authorizes warrantless action in some immigration contexts on its face, courts and the Department of Justice have read the provision in light of Fourth Amendment precedent, producing a body of case law and internal guidelines that constrain blanket claims of warrantless power; official manuals and litigation briefs underscore that the statute must be interpreted reasonably and in step with constitutional protections [4] [5] [9].
5. How policy makers and advocates use the statute today
Executive directives and White House guidance in recent years have explicitly invoked §1357(g)/287(g) as a vehicle to expand state and local participation in immigration enforcement and to structure agreements for local cooperation, prompting debate about scope and safeguards; Congress also continues to propose statutory tweaks related to officer identity and uniforms, showing the statute’s ongoing policy salience [6] [10]. Reporting and source material document the policy posture but do not provide exhaustive enforcement statistics or every jurisdiction’s practice; that data is outside the scope of the cited materials [11].
6. Bottom line and practical implications
Section 1357 is the statutory core that authorizes certain immigration enforcement activities and the formal mechanism for deputizing state and local officers, but its plain language operates within a framework of constitutional limits, implementing guidance, and judicial interpretation that temper a literal reading of unlimited warrantless powers; the statute’s use and expansion through 287(g) remain politically contested and are the subject of executive guidance and legislative proposals [1] [4] [6] [10].