How do Trump-era pardon rates compare to historical averages when adjusted for offenses and high-profile versus routine cases?
Executive summary
Donald Trump’s second-term clemency actions include mass pardons of roughly 1,500–1,600 people tied to the Jan. 6 Capitol attack and dozens of high‑profile individual pardons and commutations — bringing his cumulative use of clemency well above his first‑term rate and making his pattern distinct from recent presidents who used pardons far more sparingly and through DOJ channels [1] [2] [3] [4]. Sources show a sharp tilt toward political allies, donors and high‑profile figures and frequent bypassing of traditional Office of the Pardon Attorney processes — a contrast with historical practices and statistics maintained by the DOJ, RAND and historians [5] [6] [3] [7].
1. A numerical spike driven by mass and high‑profile grants
Trump’s second‑term blanket clemency for January 6 defendants accounted for roughly 1,500–1,600 people in a single action, immediately dwarfing routine individual pardons and creating a numerical spike that changes simple “pardons per term” comparisons with past presidents [1] [2] [8]. Ballotpedia and other trackers show he issued dozens more individual pardons in 2025 — for example, counts of 142–143 in parts of 2025 reporting — but the mass Jan. 6 action is the primary driver of his high totals [9] [2].
2. Offense mix: political and white‑collar cases dominate the headlines
Contemporary reporting documents a pattern in which many recent Trump pardons have favored political allies (fake electors, former aides, attorneys) and wealthy or high‑profile defendants — from alternate electors and Rudy Giuliani to corporate founders and foreign leaders — rather than the more typical clemency mix of low‑level drug or nonviolent offenders historically seen in some presidencies [5] [10] [11]. Critics note pardons for figures convicted of fraud, corruption or political plots; supporters and some conservative outlets argue many of these were defensible uses of the president’s constitutional authority [5] [12].
3. Process and norms: bypassing the pardon office changes context
Multiple accounts report that Trump has frequently bypassed the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney by installing political loyalists and relying on ad‑hoc recommendations, a marked departure from recent practice where the OPA screened petitions and RAND/BJS analyses informed recommendations [13] [6] [14]. The DOJ’s own historical statistics and guidance show that prior administrations at least nominally used the OPA and its processes — making Trump’s process deviations salient when judging whether clemency is routine or exceptional [7] [15].
4. How “adjusting for offense” changes comparisons
If one counts only ordinary, routine pardons (individual, post‑petition acts for nonpolitical offenses), Trump’s first term was modest compared with presidents who used clemency more frequently; his second term numbers are skewed by mass political pardons that are not comparable to traditional case‑by‑case DOJ‑vetted grants [3] [2]. Historical datasets compiled by DOJ and researchers show large variations across presidents (Franklin Roosevelt high, more recent presidents low), so any fair adjustment needs to separate mass/political acts from routine pardons processed through the OPA [15] [7].
5. High‑profile versus routine: different impacts and controversies
High‑profile pardons produce outsized political and legal consequences — erasing restitution, affecting victims, and in some cases provoking court and agency reactions — whereas routine pardons for low‑level offenders typically serve individual rehabilitation aims. Democratic House committee analysis claimed Trump’s pardons wiped out about $1.3 billion in restitution, framing substantial victim impact from certain high‑value grants; supporters counter that pardons corrected injustices or political prosecutions [16] [5].
6. Two competing interpretations in the sources
Journalistic and watchdog sources describe an administration using clemency to reward allies, loosen norms and sidestep DOJ procedures [6] [13]. Conservative and sympathetic outlets frame broad pardons — including for alternate electors or state‑level election conduct — as legitimate uses of the constitutional pardon power that correct perceived political prosecutions [12] [17]. The record in these sources shows clear disagreement about motive, propriety and effect [6] [12].
7. Limitations and what the sources don’t quantify
Available sources document counts, prominent cases and process changes but do not provide a fully normalized, offense‑level statistical model that isolates “routine” DOJ‑vetted pardons from mass political acts across administrations; DOJ clemency statistics exist but OPA lacks category breakdowns sufficient for a precise offense‑adjusted rate comparison in the materials supplied [7] [14]. For a definitive, offense‑adjusted comparison you would need case‑level DOJ data and a classification of each grant by offense and political connection — not found in current reporting [7] [14].
Bottom line: by raw numbers Trump’s second term registers as an outlier because of large, politically targeted mass pardons and many high‑profile grants; when you “adjust” to exclude those political mass actions, available reporting suggests his routine, individually vetted pardons look less extraordinary — but the sources make clear the administration’s process and the choice of beneficiaries depart from recent presidential norms [1] [3] [6].