Which UK laws are most commonly used to arrest people for tweets and social media posts?
Executive summary
UK arrests for online posts commonly invoke communications offences — chiefly Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 — and custody data obtained by the Times suggests forces averaged about 12,000 such arrests per year (roughly “over 30 a day”) between 2021–2023 (House of Lords Library summarising Times data) [1]. Parliamentary debates and civil‑liberties groups say those old statutes are being applied across many police forces with widely varying rates, prompting warnings of a chilling effect on speech [2] [3].
1. The two statutes police most often use: blunt tools from the 1980s–2000s
The House of Lords Library identifies Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 as the communications offences that criminalise sending “indecent or grossly offensive” messages — and which the Times reported as the focus of many recent arrests for online posts [1]. Parliamentary reporting repeats that these specific statutory provisions are the legal basis most frequently cited by forces when detaining people over tweets, messages and posts [2] [1].
2. Scale: arrests high, prosecutions far smaller — the data gap
Journalistic FOI work collated by the Times and cited in parliamentary material showed roughly 12,000 arrests a year on average for social‑media messages between 2021–2023 (the “over 30 arrests a day” figure), but central government does not publish arrest counts by individual offence, so national oversight is limited [1]. Reporting and advocacy groups emphasise that although arrests are high, prosecutions and convictions are far fewer — a pattern that critics say signals overuse of arrest powers [4] [5].
3. Why critics say these laws are problematic: vagueness and variation
Legal commentators, civil‑liberties organisations and MPs argue Section 1 and Section 127 are drafted in language — “grossly offensive,” “indecent,” causing “annoyance” or “anxiety” — that was not built for meme culture and can be applied inconsistently across 43 territorial forces [1] [2]. The Daily Mail and advocacy voices point to stark differences between forces and urge clearer legislation to prevent over‑policing of the internet [3].
4. Government, prosecutors and police positions: limits and guidance
The Crown Prosecution Service has issued guidance that offensive social media messages should only ordinarily lead to prosecution in “extreme circumstances,” a framing cited by commentators and pressure groups as evidence prosecutors accept limits should apply [5]. Ministers including the health secretary have said laws should be reviewed after high‑profile arrests, while also noting police are enforcing statutes passed by Parliament — signalling political awareness but no single remedy yet [6].
5. Context: lawful but awful, and offences that are clearly criminal
Sources stress a distinction between illegal speech that threatens or incites violence or terrorism — which is widely seen as plainly criminal and easier to justify enforcement — and the “lawful but awful” category where posts cause offence but may be protected expression [7]. Public debate thus centres on whether old communications statutes are being stretched into policing taste and offence rather than harm and criminal intent [7] [2].
6. What the record shows about outcomes and public concern
Investigations and fact‑checking pieces note many arrests end without charge and prison sentences remain comparatively rare; the high arrest numbers nevertheless fuel claims the system chills speech, and prominent cases (for example cited in media coverage) have provoked ministerial calls for review [4] [5] [6]. The House of Lords debate described the situation as a “free speech emergency,” reflecting parliamentary alarm [2].
7. Limitations of available reporting — what we do not know
Central government data disaggregated by those specific offence sections is not published, so comprehensive national statistics on arrests strictly under Section 1 and Section 127 are unavailable; the Times number relied on FOI returns from individual forces rather than a single official database [1]. Available sources do not mention a consolidated dataset from the Home Office covering all forces by specific offence [1].
Conclusion — competing imperatives, unsolved tradeoffs
Reporting and parliamentary debate show the UK relies heavily on two legacy communications offences (Malicious Communications Act s.1 and Communications Act s.127) to police social media, producing thousands of arrests that far outnumber prosecutions and sparking calls for statutory reform and clearer prosecutorial limits [1] [5] [2]. Critics frame the pattern as over‑policing and chilling speech; prosecutors and some ministers emphasise safeguards and the need to target genuine harm — but current public reporting and government datasets do not yet provide a single authoritative national picture [1] [6].