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What ideologies define major US domestic terrorism groups since 2020?
Executive summary
Since 2020, U.S. domestic terrorism incidents have been driven mainly by right‑wing and anti‑government ideologies (including white supremacism, militia and “boogaloo” currents), with notable activity from violent far‑left actors (anarchists/anti‑fascists) and smaller contributions from Salafi‑jihadist and misogynist “incel” actors; CSIS and U.S. government reporting highlight white supremacist and anti‑government violent extremists as the most persistent threats [1] [2] [3]. Data collection and categorization vary across projects and agencies, producing competing counts and debate over whether recent increases reflect real shifts or methodological differences [4] [5].
1. Right‑wing and racially motivated violent extremism: the most persistent threat
Multiple analyses conclude that racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism—chiefly militant white supremacist and ethnonationalist ideologies—accounted for the bulk of attacks and plots around 2020 and remain central to the domestic terrorism picture; CSIS’ 2020 dataset and U.S. agency assessments singled out white supremacists and violent far‑right actors as the dominant perpetrators in that period [1] [6]. The Congressional Research Service and other policy papers note that federal law and practice treat racially motivated violence as a major DT threat category while also stressing challenges in formally labeling domestic movements [5].
2. Anti‑government militias, “leaderless resistance,” and lone actors
Anti‑government extremism—ranging from organized militia groups to lone actors radicalized online—has produced high‑profile plots (for example, the Whitmer kidnapping conspiracy) and is often decentralized; CSIS and DHS/FBI reporting emphasize that many anti‑government incidents involve individuals with loose or no material group ties, reflecting a “post‑organisational” landscape and leaderless resistance tactics [2] [7]. The FBI told policymakers that lone offenders radicalized online represent a leading operational threat to soft targets [2] [8].
3. Far‑left violence: a smaller but visible presence, and contested trends
Violent far‑left actors—anarchists, anti‑fascists, and environmental extremists—comprised a minority but visible share of incidents in 2020 and the years shortly after; CSIS found far‑left actors conducted a notable portion of attacks and plots in 2020 and ties their activity in part to reciprocal radicalization amid protests [3] [9]. However, researchers and agencies disagree about the size and trajectory of far‑left violence, and some critics argue datasets under‑ or over‑represent particular ideologies depending on coding choices [4].
4. Salafi‑jihadist and other religiously motivated incidents: diminished share in 2020
Salafi‑jihadist–inspired incidents historically accounted for a share of U.S. domestic terrorist activity, but several reports document a drop in their relative proportion in 2020 compared with prior years; CSIS coding found Salafi‑jihadist attacks were a smaller fraction of incidents in 2020, even as they remain a concern in other years and contexts [1] [3]. The government continues to distinguish foreign‑directed terrorism from domestic violent extremism in law and practice [5] [8].
5. Incels, “nihilistic” and other non‑traditional motivators
Researchers flagged involuntary celibate (incel)–motivated attacks as one of the ideologies present in 2020 datasets, and more recently the FBI created a “nihilistic violent extremism” coding category to capture non‑ideological or mixed‑motive violent acts—underscoring that not all politically or culturally significant violence fits traditional left/right categories [1] [4].
6. Data, definitions, and the politics of measurement
Counting and categorizing domestic terrorism is contested: CRS and federal documents note the absence of a formal federal process to label domestic groups as “terrorist organizations,” which complicates cross‑project comparisons, while media and data projects have clashed with DHS about alleged biases in coding [5] [4]. CSIS’ multi‑year datasets show trends (e.g., far‑right predominance around 2020) but other analysts caution that selection, timing, and definitional choices influence results [7] [4].
7. What this means for readers and policymakers
Practical implications are clear: many recent attacks and plots come from decentralized networks or lone actors influenced by white supremacist and anti‑government ideologies, but violence emerges across the ideological spectrum—far‑left, religious, misogynist, and nihilistic actors all appear in the record—so policy and prevention must address online radicalization, decentralized networks, and local law enforcement coordination while guarding civil liberties [2] [6] [8]. Scholars urge caution in treating any single dataset as definitive given methodological debates and political pressures around labeling [4] [5].
Limitations: available sources rely heavily on CSIS datasets, government threat assessments, and media summaries; they document trends but disagree on magnitudes and coding—available sources do not mention a single, uncontested ranking of “major groups” after 2020 [7] [4].