How much cocaine is seized off Venezuela annually and which years show increases?
Executive summary
Estimates and reporting put the annual volume of cocaine transiting Venezuela in the rough range of 200–250 metric tons in recent years, a figure the U.S. State Department first cited for 2020 and that some observers say persisted into 2023 [1]. Official seizure records show large year‑to‑year variation — for example, Venezuelan authorities reported seizing about 32.6 tonnes in 2022 and 43.7 tonnes in 2023, a 34% increase reported by InSight Crime [2]. Available sources do not provide a single consistent yearly series of seizures stretching across a long time span; instead they offer snapshots, estimates of flows, and differing attributions of trend direction (multiple sources, see [1]; [2]; [14]1).
1. What the headline numbers mean: “transit” versus “seizures”
Most sources distinguish between estimated volumes of cocaine trafficked through Venezuela and the much smaller quantities actually seized by authorities. The U.S. interagency estimate cited in the State Department’s reports put shipments transiting Venezuela at roughly 200–250 metric tons annually as of a 2020 estimate; WOLA and the State Department restate that range [1]. By contrast, seizure totals reported by Venezuelan authorities or by reporting outlets are measured in the tens of tonnes per year (for example, 43.7 t seized in 2023) and therefore represent only a fraction of estimated flows [2].
2. Where the “200–250 tonnes” figure comes from and how it’s used
The commonly cited 200–250 t figure appears in U.S. government reporting and is repeated by analysts and NGOs as an estimate of cocaine transiting Venezuela around 2020; the March 2025 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report and WOLA’s summary reference that U.S. estimate [1]. That estimate is not a seizure total; it is an assessment of volumes moving through Venezuelan routes, derived from interagency intelligence and modelling rather than from police tally sheets [1]. Journalists and policymakers sometimes conflate the two, producing confusion between “trafficked through” and “seized in” Venezuela [1] [2].
3. Recent year‑to‑year seizure changes recorded in reporting
Independent reporting collated by InSight Crime shows seizures in Venezuela rising from a reported low of 32.6 t in 2022 to 43.7 t in 2023 — a 34% uptick — and attributes much of 2024’s seizures to the border with Colombia [2] [3]. Other pieces note large individual hauls (for example, reported single seizures of multiple tonnes) that can skew annual totals and underline volatility [4] [5]. UNODC maps and reports provide trafficking-flow context for 2020–2023 but do not publish a single annual Venezuelan seizure time series in the cited extracts [6] [7].
4. Why “increases” can be misleading: enforcement, reporting and route shifts
Seizure totals rise or fall for at least three operational reasons that do not necessarily track production or trafficking volume: changes in enforcement priority and capacity, improved cooperation with foreign law enforcement, and traffickers shifting routes or concealment techniques. Analysts note that Colombia remains the dominant origin of global cocaine production and that much of the North American flow does not primarily route through Venezuela, so rising Venezuelan seizures can reflect enforcement focus or route diversion rather than a sudden surge in Venezuelan production [8] [9] [10].
5. Competing narratives and political uses of the data
Different actors use these figures to support divergent agendas. U.S. officials and some commentators cite large transit estimates to justify military or counter‑narcotics pressure on Venezuela [11] [9]. Other analysts and NGOs caution against a “narcostate” framing and stress that publicly available event data and the UNODC reporting show Venezuela as predominantly a transit corridor with a minority share of global seizures [12] [7]. The Guardian and UNODC material note Venezuela’s share of global seizures fell from about 2.3% in 2020 to 1.9% by 2023, underscoring that Venezuela is not the largest locus of recorded seizures globally [13].
6. What’s missing and how to read these gaps
Available sources do not publish a comprehensive, consistently comparable multi‑year seizure time series for Venezuela that reconciles national totals, UNODC reporting, and U.S. interagency flow estimates; gaps persist between “seizures recorded” and “estimated tonnes transiting.” Many figures cited (200–250 t; year‑to‑year seizure increases) come from different methodologies and should not be treated as directly interchangeable without explicit provenance [1] [2] [7].
7. Bottom line for readers
Use two separate buckets when interpreting these numbers: seizure totals (tens of tonnes annually, with documented increases such as 32.6 t → 43.7 t from 2022 to 2023 reported by InSight Crime) and interagency transit estimates (on the order of 200–250 t cited by U.S. reports for around 2020) that model flows rather than record interdictions [2] [1]. The record shows increases in seizure counts in specific years, but those changes do not, on their own, prove equivalent increases in total trafficking through Venezuela [2] [1].