Which drug cartels or armed groups operate in Venezuela and what substances do they move?
Executive summary
Venezuela is a hub where foreign cartels, Colombian guerrillas, large local gangs (“megabandas”) and alleged networks of corrupt security officials intersect; reporting identifies cocaine as the principal commodity transited through Venezuela, alongside documented movement of methamphetamine, fentanyl and precursors in some U.S. accounts [1] [2] [3]. The U.S. has designated the so-called “Cartel de los Soles,” Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel as terrorist or sanctioned entities and has cited cocaine, fentanyl, methamphetamine and other illicit drugs in its allegations [2] [4] [5].
1. Cartel de los Soles — a label, a loose network, or a state enterprise?
Washington’s recent move to label “Cartel de los Soles” a terrorist organisation reflects U.S. allegations that high-ranking Venezuelan officials and military figures have enabled and profited from large-scale cocaine shipments, and that the network has facilitated links to groups like Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel [2] [4]. Independent analysts and Venezuelan journalists describe the Cartel de los Soles not as a classic hierarchical cartel but as a dispersed, informal set of corrupt officials and intermediaries who help traffickers — a “loose network” rather than a single command structure [6] [7] [8].
2. Mexican cartels and Tren de Aragua — foreign and domestic traffickers operating inside Venezuela
Reporting shows Mexican organisations such as the Sinaloa Cartel operate through Venezuelan routes, and U.S. authorities say Tren de Aragua—an armed Venezuelan gang—has been linked with narcotics shipments; the Treasury and State Department have explicitly named Sinaloa and Tren de Aragua in sanctions and terrorist-style designations [2] [5]. Scholarly and policy commentary stresses that Venezuelan routes increasingly connect South American production zones to Caribbean and Atlantic corridors used by Mexican cartels for distribution to Europe and the U.S. [3] [1].
3. Colombian guerrillas (ELN, FARC dissidents) — territorial presence and trafficking partnerships
Open-source monitoring and U.S. reporting document that Colombia’s ELN and FARC dissidents maintain bases and operate along Venezuela’s western border, using Venezuelan territory as safe havens and transit corridors; they form commercial relationships with corrupt officials and criminal groups to protect trafficking routes [9] [10] [1]. The U.S. State Department and regional analysts say these armed groups profit from and facilitate the cocaine trade across Venezuelan borders [10] [1].
4. Megabandas and local gangs — domestic consolidation of violence and shipments
ACLED and local investigations highlight the rise of “megabandas,” heavily armed Venezuelan gangs with 50+ members that run extortion, kidnapping and drug-trafficking operations inside cities and coastal departure points; they increasingly control ports, beaches and informal airstrips used for shipments [9] [11]. Transparency and investigative reporting link these groups to production sites and coastal departure points in Zulia, Falcón, La Guaira, and eastern states, creating multiple nodes for cocaine and synthetic drug exports [11] [12].
5. What substances move through Venezuela — cocaine dominates; synthetics appear too
Multiple sources identify cocaine as the principal commodity transiting Venezuela from Colombia to the Caribbean, U.S., Europe and West Africa; corrupt officials, foreign guerrillas and transnational cartels exploit Venezuela’s porous borders and weak rule of law for large shipments [1] [13]. U.S. sanctions and statements also allege trafficking of fentanyl, methamphetamine and “other illicit drugs” in relation to Sinaloa-linked flows and Maduro-linked networks, though analysts caution that fentanyl supply chains to the U.S. remain primarily linked to Mexico and Chinese precursors [2] [3].
6. Evidence disputes and political uses of the “cartel” narrative
Scholars, journalists and former officials argue there is abundant evidence of corruption and military involvement in trafficking but dispute whether the Cartel de los Soles exists as a single, centrally commanded cartel led by Maduro; some view the U.S. designations as politically motivated and warn they may be used to justify coercive measures [6] [8] [14]. Others—including U.S. Treasury and prosecutors—point to guilty pleas, sanctions and indictments (e.g., former intelligence chief Hugo Carvajal) as concrete proof of senior-state involvement in trafficking [2] [15].
7. Operational implications — fragmented actors, multiple routes, high uncertainty
Analysts emphasise that Venezuela’s trafficking ecosystem is plural: transnational cartels, Colombian rebels, Venezuelan megabandas and networks of corrupt officials can act both cooperatively and competitively, which makes targeting single “cartels” operationally difficult and creates high risks for civilian harm when militarised responses expand [12] [16] [17]. Sources note U.S. strikes and designations change incentives but do not, by themselves, resolve the structural enablers—porous borders, weak institutions and illicit economies [16] [12].
Limitations and final note: available sources document the names, actors and drugs above but differ sharply on structure and leadership claims—U.S. government designations and Treasury statements [2] [4] coexist with academic and investigative caution that “Cartel de los Soles” may be an umbrella label for diffuse corruption rather than a conventional cartel [7] [8].