Which specific routes do drug traffickers use from Venezuela through the eastern Caribbean to the US?
Executive summary
Venezuelan-origin cocaine historically moves north from Sucre state and Margarita Island into nearby eastern Caribbean islands (notably Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Martinique and Guadeloupe) via fast “go‑fast” boats and speedboats; U.S. and other reporting says the “Caribbean route” carried large volumes — U.S. estimates put Venezuela’s 2024 outflow at roughly 350–500 tons — but most cocaine to the U.S. moves via the Eastern Pacific (about 74%), leaving a smaller but persistent eastern‑Caribbean vector (about 8–20% depending on the report) [1] [2] [3] [4]. Recent U.S. military strikes have focused on vessels operating off Venezuela and the southern/eastern Caribbean, with officials saying strikes hit boats on known transit lines to the U.S. and to nearby islands [5] [6] [7].
1. Geography and the choke points traffickers exploit
Traffickers use Venezuela’s northeastern coast — especially Sucre state and hubs like Güiria and Margarita Island — as launch points into the eastern Caribbean. Insight Crime and other reporting identify Margarita Island and Sucre as strategic stepping stones where small, fast boats load and run to nearby islands and across open water toward the greater Caribbean and beyond [1] [5]. Those coastal departures take advantage of proximity to islands with smaller patrol capacities and short sea crossings that reduce exposure time at sea [1].
2. The typical vessel and tactics: speedboats, “go‑fast” runs and island relays
Sources repeatedly describe the use of speedboats and go‑fast boats for the eastern Caribbean corridor. These craft make short, high‑speed crossings to islands such as Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Martinique and Guadeloupe; from there loads may be transshipped to larger vessels, concealed in commercial traffic, or moved onward by air or overland networks [1] [4]. U.S. officials characterize the intercepted and struck vessels as operating on “known narco‑trafficking transit routes” [5].
3. How the eastern Caribbean route compares with the Pacific vector
U.S. and independent analyses show an asymmetric picture: the Eastern Pacific remains the dominant corridor for cocaine headed ultimately to the United States — roughly 74% by one DEA/US estimate — while the Caribbean route accounts for a much smaller share (commonly cited figures range from 8% up to a broader “Western Caribbean” share) [3] [4]. WOLA and other analysts note the Pacific handles the bulk, leaving the Caribbean as a significant but secondary vector, often with stronger links from Venezuela toward Europe as well as the U.S. [3] [4].
4. Islands and states named in reporting as relay points or targets
Reporting names several specific destinations and relay islands: Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada are repeatedly mentioned alongside French overseas departments (Martinique, Guadeloupe) and eastern Caribbean states; those islands are described as common first stops for fast‑boat runs from Venezuela and as areas where traffickers attempt to establish lines to the wider Caribbean and North America [1] [5] [4].
5. Recent U.S. focus and how that alters routes
Since September 2025 the U.S. has carried out multiple strikes against vessels in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific, asserting those boats were on trafficking routes from Venezuela to the U.S.; officials say the campaign has struck boats on the eastern‑Caribbean corridor and that the U.S. interdiction push has “effectively shut down” portions of the Caribbean route, prompting traffickers to either halt or shift operations [5] [2] [8]. Analysts caution that interdiction at sea often displaces flows rather than eliminates them, and WOLA’s research emphasizes the Pacific’s dominance even amid Caribbean pressure [3] [8].
6. Competing narratives and political context
U.S. authorities frame the strikes as counternarcotics actions against “narco‑terrorists” and vessels on known routes; critics and legal experts argue the strikes complicate longstanding interdiction cooperation with regional partners and may violate international norms, while Venezuelan officials call the campaign a pretext for regime pressure [7] [9] [4]. Reporting also notes significant political aims behind U.S. pressure — including trying to cut revenue streams said to sustain parts of Venezuela’s security apparatus — which can shape intelligence prioritization and target selection [2] [9].
7. What the sources do not say or remain uncertain about
Available sources do not map a single, continuous set of GPS coordinates or a complete step‑by‑step route list from launch points in Venezuela through each island to the U.S.; they provide country/region‑level chokepoints (Sucre, Margarita, neighboring islands), vessel types, and approximate flow shares but stop short of publishing operational route maps or exhaustive transit chains [1] [3] [5].
8. Bottom line — a shifting, multi‑modal corridor
The eastern Caribbean functions as a well‑used but secondary corridor for Venezuelan‑origin shipments, relying on fast boats to nearby islands (Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Martinique/Guadeloupe, etc.) and then onward movement. U.S. military action since September 2025 has concentrated on these maritime legs and reportedly disrupted parts of the “Caribbean route,” but major reporting and analysts emphasize that the Pacific corridor remains the largest single vector for cocaine to the United States [1] [8] [3].