What are the main Venezuelan cartels or organizations controlling drug exports to the U.S. in 2025?
Executive summary
U.S. authorities in 2025 point most of their Venezuelan-focused accusations at the so-called “Cartel de los Soles,” which the Treasury sanctioned July 25, 2025 and the State Department moved to designate as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in November 2025 [1] [2]. Reporting and experts disagree on whether that label describes a single hierarchical cartel or a loose, state-embedded network of corrupt officials and multiple criminal groups operating from Venezuela, including Tren de Aragua and links to Mexican cartels such as Sinaloa [3] [4] [5].
1. Cartel de los Soles: U.S. denunciation, but scholarly dispute
The U.S. Treasury described Cartel de los Soles as a Venezuela-based criminal group headed by Nicolás Maduro and other senior officials and sanctioned it as an SDGT on July 25, 2025; the State Department later announced an FTO designation effective November 24, 2025 [1] [2]. Many Venezuela specialists and regional analysts, however, argue “Cartel de los Soles” is not a conventional cartel but a phrase used to describe corrupt elements inside the military and state institutions; several outlets note that independent evidence of a single, centrally coordinated cartel has not been publicly presented [5] [4] [6].
2. Tren de Aragua and other organized groups operating from Venezuela
U.S. statements and reporting identify Tren de Aragua — a violent Venezuelan prison-based gang that expanded beyond prisons — among groups targeted in U.S. counter-narcotics and counterterrorism moves, and U.S. officials linked it as an organization the Cartel de los Soles allegedly supported [3]. Reuters and other outlets report U.S. sources have singled out Tren de Aragua in operations and designations [7].
3. External cartel ties: Sinaloa and Mexican trafficking networks
U.S. law-enforcement narratives have accused Venezuelan-linked actors of providing routes or support to large Mexican cartels such as Sinaloa; Treasury language explicitly connected Cartel de los Soles to material support for the Sinaloa Cartel in its July 2025 sanctions release [3]. Independent reporting and analysts caution that most fentanyl and large-scale production remain centered in Mexico, and major flows to the U.S. still transit the Eastern Pacific rather than the Caribbean [8] [9] [10].
4. What the evidence in public reporting shows — and what it does not
U.S. indictments, Treasury and State Department actions, and some guilty pleas (e.g., ex-intelligence officials) form the basis for official U.S. claims tying senior Venezuelan figures to large-scale trafficking [1] [11]. At the same time, investigative outlets, think tanks and scholars cited in press coverage stress that the idea of a unified, top-down cartel structure is contested; many experts describe drug trafficking in Venezuela as fragmented, involving military facilitators, prison gangs, regional criminal networks, and foreign cartels — not a single corporate hierarchy [4] [5] [6].
5. The operational picture in 2025: routes, proportion and U.S. focus
U.S. military and diplomatic actions in 2025 narrowed their operational focus on Venezuelan waters and groups Washington labeled narcoterrorists, citing boat strikes and a regional naval buildup; as of mid-November 2025 the U.S. reported dozens of maritime strikes and hundreds of deployed forces tied to “Operation Southern Spear” and similar actions [12] [13]. Independent analyses note that the Eastern Pacific route (largely via Mexico) accounts for the majority of drugs bound for the U.S., with the Caribbean—where Venezuelan flows operate—constituting a smaller share [10] [9].
6. Competing narratives and implicit agendas
U.S. officials frame designations and military pressure as an anti-drug imperative, asserting Maduro and state actors run or enable networks moving cocaine and other drugs to the U.S. [1] [2]. Critics and many regional experts view the designations and military posture as also serving political objectives—pressure aimed at Maduro’s regime—and they warn that labeling a diffuse phenomenon as a single “cartel” simplifies complex criminal governance and may justify escalatory policies [6] [5] [4].
7. Practical takeaway for readers: names to watch, and limits of public evidence
In 2025, the principal names appearing in U.S. public actions and major reporting are Cartel de los Soles (the focal U.S. designation), Tren de Aragua (a violent Venezuelan gang cited in U.S. actions), and alleged ties to Mexican cartels such as Sinaloa [1] [3]. Available sources do not mention a clear, publicly documented single corporate Venezuelan cartel structure equivalent to historical cartels like Medellín; instead, reporting describes fragmented networks, state-facilitated routes, and contested interpretations of the same facts [5] [4].
Limitations: public reporting and official statements provide competing interpretations; some primary evidence remains sealed in indictments or classified briefings, and experts disagree about whether U.S. labels accurately capture on-the-ground criminal organization [5] [4].