How do Venezuelan drug traffickers use small islands and cays for cocaine transshipment?
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Executive summary
Venezuelan islands and cays — including Margarita and the Los Roques archipelago — are documented transshipment nodes used to move Colombian cocaine onward to the Caribbean, Europe and the U.S., in part because they provide maritime access and relative stealth compared with mainland ports [1]. Recent U.S. military strikes and an expanded counter‑narcotics campaign in Caribbean waters respond to that surge: by late 2025 the U.S. had conducted some two dozen strikes on small vessels it said were trafficking narcotics, killing dozens and drawing debate over effectiveness and motive [2] [3] [4].
1. Islands as convenient staging grounds: geography, access, and plausible deniability
Small islands and cays such as Margarita and Los Roques give traffickers straightforward maritime access to the Caribbean and Atlantic — they are remote, require boat or air access, and sit on routes toward the Eastern Caribbean, West Africa and trans‑Atlantic lanes — making them attractive transshipment or staging points for Colombian cocaine moving through Venezuela [1] [5]. Insight Crime documents a Colombian trafficker using Margarita as a backdoor to Europe and notes Los Roques has been used to traffic gold and drugs, signaling that archipelagos serve as logistical hubs between production zones and long‑range shipment corridors [1].
2. Corruption, payoffs and control of routes as enabling factors
Reporting suggests the logistical difficulty of island access — ferries, private planes, motorboats and checkpoints — is often overcome by paying off officials or by criminal groups asserting local control, turning islands into de facto transshipment platforms rather than simple waypoints [1]. Insight Crime says the likely involvement of payments to Venezuelan officials made the Margarita operation feasible, implying that collusion or local toleration remains an important enabler [1].
3. Criminal groups, state actors and the “Cartel of the Suns” allegation
Multiple sources place organized gangs and networks — including Colombian groups and Venezuelan criminal elements — at the center of island routes; some U.S. officials and commentators have tied higher‑level Venezuelan military involvement to a so‑called “Cartel of the Suns,” though that allegation is part of wider political controversy about state complicity [4] [6]. The Atlantic piece and U.S. reporting document indictments and allegations but also note disagreements over how much top‑level Venezuelan command structures control trafficking versus local criminal gangs [4] [6].
4. Routes and end markets: Caribbean, Europe, and West Africa
Authorities and analysts cited by international press say Venezuelan maritime routes increasingly serve not only U.S. markets but also Europe, often via West Africa and island chokepoints; seizures such as a Spain‑bound vessel intercepted near the Canaries underscore that flow [5]. NBC and other outlets indicate much of the maritime movement observed in 2024–25 has been oriented toward Europe, complicating the picture of which consumers these island transshipments ultimately serve [6] [5].
5. U.S. strikes, deterrence claims and counterarguments over effectiveness
The United States responded with an increasingly militarized campaign in Caribbean waters, conducting strikes on small vessels it identified as narco‑trafficking boats; by late 2025 reporting counts roughly 20–21 strikes and dozens of deaths, and U.S. officials argue the strikes target narcotics flows that use Venezuelan waters and islands as staging areas [2] [3]. Critics — including veterans of law enforcement and analysts — argue the strikes are unlikely to disrupt major cartels in Colombia or Mexico and warn the campaign may be politically motivated or counterproductive, raising questions about whether attacking small maritime nodes meaningfully degrades broader supply chains [4] [3].
6. Operational methods traffickers reportedly use on islands and cays
Available reporting describes several practical uses: islands serve as intermediate drop points where cargo is split, repacked or hidden for later pickup; they allow transfers from larger to smaller boats to avoid law enforcement; and they provide routes to alternative markets via island‑to‑island hops or onward shipments through West Africa. Insight Crime and contemporary reporting on specific prosecutions emphasize staging, transfers and payment structures that make these tactics viable [1] [5]. Detailed technical methods (specific concealment designs, exact transfer protocols) are not exhaustively described in the supplied sources.
7. Limits of current public reporting and investigative gaps
Public sources here document examples and strategic patterns but do not provide a full chain‑of‑custody map, quantified share of shipments using islands, nor exhaustive proof of high‑level Venezuelan state direction; those elements remain contested in reporting and official claims [1] [4]. The lack of granular, independently verifiable forensic detail on many incidents is fueling both aggressive military responses and skeptical counterarguments in media and expert circles [3] [4].
8. Competing narratives and what to watch next
Two competing frames dominate coverage: U.S. officials and some outlets frame island transshipments as a clear narcotics security threat justifying strikes and pressure on Venezuela [2] [3]; critics and analysts argue strikes won’t meaningfully stop major cartels and may serve geopolitical aims, urging investigations and multilateral law‑enforcement cooperation instead [4] [6]. Future reporting to watch includes prosecution documents (like the Margarita case), independent seizure data, and multilateral interdiction results that could clarify how central islands are to cocaine flows [1] [5].