What trends in Venezuelan cocaine production and trafficking were reported in 2024 and 2025?

1. The headline numbers: discordant seizure and flow estimates

Different organizations produced sharply different tallies for 2024. A Transparencia Venezuela compilation cites Venezuelan authorities as reporting “more than 848 tons of cocaine” seized in 2024, up 14% from 2023 ^[1]. In contrast, InSight Crime’s monitoring found Venezuelan authorities seized 35.1 tons in 2024 — a near 20% fall from 2023 — and highlighted large seizures in neighboring states and maritime interdictions involving Venezuelan departure points ^[2]. Analysts and U.S. sources have also cited estimates that roughly 200–250 metric tons transited Venezuela annually in earlier years, a figure used in policy debates ^[4].

2. From transit corridor to alleged producer: evolving assessments

Multiple investigative outlets have documented increased coca cultivation and makeshift processing in Venezuelan border regions, arguing Venezuela has shifted from mainly a transit route to some level of domestic cocaine production; InSight Crime and El País flagged coca fields and processing in Zulia and Apure ^{[5] [6]}. Yet major international datasets and UN summaries continue to place the bulk of global coca cultivation in the Andean states — Colombia, Peru and Bolivia — and do not designate Venezuela as a leading producer in the same league ^[3].

3. Who’s running the business? Fragmentation, armed groups and allegations of state involvement

Reporting through 2024–25 repeatedly documents a fragmented criminal ecology: Colombian guerrilla dissidents (ELN, ex-FARC splinters), Mexican cartels, Venezuelan gangs and armed actors compete for routes and production nodes, with accusations that some Venezuelan security elements profit or participate. Leaked Colombian prosecutor material and U.S. statements allege involvement of Venezuelan military actors; other outlets stress bribery, competing factions, and that “Cartel de los Soles” may be an umbrella term rather than a tight hierarchical cartel ^{[7] [6] [8]}.

4. Routes and markets shifted: Europe and West Africa increasingly important

Multiple sources describe a growing share of cocaine leaving Venezuela bound for European markets via Caribbean hubs and West Africa rather than a straight northbound stream to the U.S. Noted examples include multi-ton shipments interdicted en route to Europe and analyses that Caribbean departures often serve European demand, where kilogram prices are higher ^{[9] [10] [11]}.

5. Policy reaction and contested narratives: U.S. strikes and political framing

In 2025 the U.S. escalated militarized counter‑drug actions — including strikes on boats — and political leaders framed Venezuela as central to narco-threats; critics argue the evidence does not match the rhetoric. U.S. operations and presidential statements provoked debate: advocates cite indictments and alleged trafficking through Venezuela, while other analysts point out UN and DEA reporting that does not single out Venezuela as a primary producer and warn military action risks being driven by regime‑change aims ^{[12] [13] [3]}.

6. Data limitations and competing methodologies

Observers warn seizure figures and flow estimates depend heavily on methods and sources: government-reported seizures can mix transit-country statistics and may be politically shaped; NGO monitoring uses open-source tracking; U.S. estimates rely on law-enforcement intelligence and modeling. Transparencia Venezuela’s high seizures number, InSight Crime’s lower tally, and U.S. 200–250 t estimates illustrate how differing inputs yield divergent pictures — and how policymakers can cherry-pick figures ^{[1] [2] [4]}.

7. What’s clear — and what remains uncertain

What is clear in the sources: transnational trafficking networks operate through Venezuelan territory; armed and criminal groups have expanded activity along border states; several large multi-ton shipments traced to Venezuelan points were interdicted in 2024 and 2025 ^{[2] [11] [14]}. What remains uncertain in available reporting: the precise volume of cocaine produced inside Venezuela versus trafficked through it, the degree of centralized, state-directed control versus decentralized corruption and competition, and the net impact of 2025 U.S. strikes on trafficking flows ^{[5] [6] [13]}. Available sources do not mention a definitive, independently verified national production total that resolves those disputes.

Sources cited above present competing viewpoints: Venezuelan and exile NGOs, investigative outlets (Insight Crime), U.S. government and watchdog analyses, and international bodies (UN/European briefs). Each contributes pieces of the picture but also reflects methodological and political lenses that shape conclusions ^{[1] [2] [3] [13]}.