What maritime routes do Venezuelan drug traffickers use through the Caribbean to reach the US?
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Executive summary
Venezuelan-linked traffickers use maritime corridors from Venezuela’s Caribbean coast — including Sucre, Falcón and Margarita Island — to send cocaine to the Eastern Caribbean (islands such as Martinique, Guadeloupe) and onward toward the United States and Europe; U.S. sources estimated Venezuela remained a hub for roughly 200–250 metric tons annually in 2020 and similar levels thereafter [1] [2]. Reporting and expert commentary describe both traditional sea routes and an “air bridge” shift to aircraft, while recent U.S. naval operations in 2025 targeted those sea lines of communication and reportedly disrupted a busy “Caribbean route” responsible for hundreds of tons [1] [3] [4].
1. Venezuela’s Caribbean coast as a staging ground
Multiple analyses identify Venezuela’s northern coastline — notably states such as Sucre, Falcón and the islands around Nueva Esparta including Margarita Island — as recurring launch points for maritime shipments bound for the Eastern Caribbean and beyond, with organized groups trying to control those coastal territories to establish direct transport links to the islands [5] [6] [1].
2. Routes and destinations used: Eastern Caribbean first, then onward
Traffickers commonly route shipments to nearby Eastern Caribbean islands (examples cited include Martinique and Guadeloupe), from where cargo either transits by smaller vessels toward the U.S. mainland or is re-exported to Europe; investigative reporting and organized‑crime analysts note Venezuela-to-Eastern‑Caribbean maritime moves were a clear pattern between 2022–2024 [6] [1].
3. Volume estimates and strategic weight of the sea lanes
U.S. and independent reporting place substantial volumes through Venezuelan channels: U.S. estimates in 2020 put cocaine transiting Venezuela at 200–250 metric tons annually, and some contemporary reporting framed 2024 Caribbean shipments from Venezuela as between roughly 350–500 tons a year before 2025 U.S. interdiction operations [2] [3]. Those figures underpin why militaries and law‑enforcement actors focused on maritime interdiction.
4. Methods and craft: go‑fast boats, larger conveyances and an “air bridge” alternative
Sources document a mix of small, fast boats for direct island runs and larger sea shipments for transatlantic movements; at the same time U.S. officials and prosecutors have highlighted an “air bridge” from Venezuelan airstrips to Central America and the Caribbean as a complementary trafficking modality, indicating traffickers diversify by sea and air [1].
5. Criminal actors and territorial control dynamics
Organized groups named in reporting — including Tren de Aragua and networks associated by U.S. authorities with the so‑called “Cartel de los Soles” — seek to control coastal zones and ports to secure direct maritime routes into the Eastern Caribbean, and analysts say Venezuelan state actors or security elements have at times facilitated or profited from these economies [5] [1] [4].
6. Impact of U.S. naval buildup and strikes on those maritime routes
From mid‑2025 the U.S. deployed a major naval presence and carried out strikes on suspected drug vessels in the Caribbean; U.S. and media sources reported those operations temporarily disrupted maritime departures and, according to some confidential sources cited by the Miami Herald and military outlets, “effectively shut down” the busy Caribbean route — a claim echoed in coverage describing reduced boat traffic and targeted hits on vessels [3] [4].
7. Alternative viewpoints and limits of public evidence
While U.S. officials present maritime strikes as hitting drug shipments and severing routes, critics and some news outlets note contested legal and factual bases for lethal strikes and point out shifting objectives — including political pressure on the Maduro government — alongside drug‑control claims [5] [7]. Independent analysts caution the Eastern Pacific still handles the bulk of U.S.-bound shipments (up to 80% per U.S. Southern Command posture), meaning the Caribbean represents only part of the problem [2].
8. What reporting does not say (important gaps)
Available sources do not provide a comprehensive, independently verifiable map of specific sea lanes, timetables or vessel manifests for Venezuelan maritime trafficking; nor do they publish firm forensic trail evidence linking every struck vessel to confirmed drug loads — independent verification of many operational claims is limited in current reporting [5] [3].
9. What this means for policy and enforcement
The combination of sizable trafficking estimates, coastal criminal control and a mix of sea and air methods explains why governments have prioritized maritime interdiction and intelligence cooperation; however, analysts note that disrupting one corridor tends to shift flows to others (air routes, Eastern Pacific), so interdiction alone is unlikely to stop bulk flows without broader regional cooperation and source‑country disruption [2] [6].
Sources cited: reporting and analyses summarized above — including InsightCrime, Miami Herald/military reporting, U.S. State Department/analyst estimates and NGO briefings [5] [1] [3] [2] [4] [6] [7].