How do Venezuelan military and intelligence agencies facilitate narcotrafficking operations?
Executive summary
U.S. officials and multiple outlets allege senior Venezuelan military and government figures are linked to a network dubbed the “Cartel de los Soles,” and the U.S. has moved to designate that network a foreign terrorist organization while mounting strikes on suspected drug vessels off Venezuela, actions that the U.S. says have killed dozens (e.g., the U.S. reports more than 60–80 killed in strikes) [1] [2] [3]. Independent reporting and international bodies, however, note important caveats: UNODC data indicate the main cocaine flows to North America originate in Andean countries and are not primarily routed through Venezuelan ports, and some regional governments have said the evidence tying Venezuela’s central authorities to trafficking is not publicly demonstrated [4] [5].
1. The allegation: a militarized “Cartel de los Soles” tied to Maduro
The U.S. State Department and senior U.S. officials assert that the Cartel de los Soles—allegedly composed of senior military officers and government figures and long discussed by Venezuelan journalists—has been formalized into an FTO designation linking it to President Nicolás Maduro and high-ranking officials who “corrupted Venezuela’s military, intelligence, legislature, and judiciary” [1]. That framing underpins recent U.S. policy moves, including a $50 million reward for Maduro and stepped-up military pressure in the Caribbean [6] [1].
2. How U.S. actions try to disrupt alleged state-linked trafficking
Washington has responded by increasing naval and air presence in the Caribbean, mounting a campaign of strikes on vessels it says were carrying drugs, and briefing options for broader operations; U.S. statements tie those strikes and deployments to the effort to disrupt narcotrafficking networks linked to Venezuela [7] [2]. U.S. officials characterize the strikes as part of a campaign to target “narcoterrorists” and to use terrorism designations to allow actions against assets and infrastructure [7] [2].
3. What the reporting documents about Venezuelan military or intelligence facilitation
Available reporting included here documents the U.S. allegation that senior military and intelligence officials have been implicated in trafficking and that Venezuela’s forces have been militarized and integrated into governance, creating opportunities for corruption and illicit logistics [1] [8]. The Stimson Center and other analysts also note the presence and activities of Venezuelan security agencies like SEBIN in the regional debate, suggesting extraterritorial intelligence roles that complicate the picture [9].
4. Contradictions and limits in the public evidence
Independent data cited in the reporting undermine the claim that Venezuela is the primary conduit for U.S.-bound cocaine: the UNODC’s World Drug Report 2025 finds main cocaine flows to North America stem from Andean states, not primarily through Venezuelan ports [4]. Some regional governments (Mexico, Colombia) and journalists note a lack of publicly released, verifiable evidence tying Maduro personally to trafficking, and critics argue the U.S. has not published detailed proof supporting lethal strikes [5] [10].
5. How military/intelligence agencies could facilitate trafficking—reported mechanisms
Where sources describe mechanisms, they point to militarized governance and coopted chains of command that can enable trafficking: senior officers in positions overseeing ports, coastal patrols and customs; intelligence services (SEBIN) with extraterritorial reach; and a reward/rewarding patronage system that can make units complicit or permissive—claims crystallized in the U.S. narrative about the Cartel de los Soles [1] [8] [9]. The reporting, however, does not provide a forensic, item-by-item accounting of specific illicit shipments moved by identified agencies in open-source detail—those specifics are not found in current reporting (available sources do not mention specific documented agency-by-agency shipment logs).
6. Regional and legal pushback: competing viewpoints
Regional leaders and analysts warn that U.S. military strikes and designations risk escalation, could lack due process, and might be counterproductive; some countries have halted intelligence sharing in protest and legal scholars question the international-law basis for extraterritorial strikes without publicly disclosed evidence [9] [5] [3]. Conversely, U.S. officials argue the scale of the buildup and the FTO designation are necessary to disrupt networks and to use military options to protect U.S. borders [7] [2].
7. What reporters and analysts recommend watching next
Monitor whether the U.S. publishes concrete, verifiable intelligence linking named Venezuelan officials or specific units to discrete trafficking events, and whether international bodies (UNODC, regional prosecutors) corroborate those links; also watch for shifts in Venezuelan military posture and for changes in cooperation from neighboring states, which would affect interdiction capabilities [4] [7] [6]. Absent transparent, public evidence, accusations of state-directed trafficking will remain contested and will continue to shape both regional diplomacy and military risk calculations [1] [5].
Limitations: sources cited here include U.S. government statements, mainstream press summaries and advocacy/analysis pieces; available sources do not mention detailed, publicly released chain-of-custody evidence for specific shipments tied to named intelligence or military units (available sources do not mention specific shipment logs).