Which criminal groups in Venezuela control cocaine production and export?
Executive summary
Venezuelan territory functions largely as a transit and facilitation zone for cocaine produced in Colombia, with multiple actors—elements of the Venezuelan military and state (commonly called the “Cartel de los Soles”), armed Colombian groups (FARC dissidents/ELN), and transnational Mexican cartels—implicated in production, trafficking and export networks [1] [2] [3]. U.S. authorities have accused the Cartel de los Soles and Maduro-linked officials of leading or enabling trafficking; independent analysts and some reporting say the evidence describes widespread institutional corruption and collusion more than a single hierarchical cartellike producer-operator [4] [5] [6].
1. Who is producing the cocaine — Colombia remains the primary source
Most reporting and official assessments treat Venezuela mainly as a transit, processing and export corridor rather than the principal origin of bulk cocaine destined for the U.S. and Europe; Colombia is repeatedly identified as the main producer and source for most supply [7] [8] [9]. Analysts warn that while some production or “mills” may exist in Venezuela, the dominant production footprint for cocaine remains in Colombia and supply chains often cross borders [9] [8].
2. The Cartel de los Soles: a label for corrupt officials with trafficking links
U.S. authorities have designated the Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization and sanction it as a group headed by Nicolás Maduro and high-ranking officials, accusing it of materially supporting and facilitating cocaine exports and collaborating with groups such as Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel [4] [10]. Independent reporting and organized‑crime experts, however, characterise “Cartel de los Soles” more as a descriptive label for networks of corrupt military and security officers rather than a tightly centralized hierarchical cartel, and they caution that evidence of direct central coordination by Maduro is contested [5] [2] [6].
3. Armed Colombian groups and guerrilla dissidents operate inside Venezuela
Investigations and official indictments have long described FARC dissidents and ELN units using Venezuelan territory as safe haven and transport platforms—organising air and sea “bridges” and working with local actors to move cocaine toward Central America and the Caribbean [3] [2]. U.S. indictments and reporting cite collaboration between Venezuelan officials and Colombian armed groups in organizing routes and facilities for shipments [3] [2].
4. Mexican cartels: partners in export and distribution
Mexican cartels, including Sinaloa, are repeatedly cited by U.S. agencies and sanction actions as important partners in the trans‑Hemisphere distribution chain—receiving cocaine flows that transit Venezuela en route to North American and European markets [4] [3]. U.S. policy documents and reporting also link Mexican criminal groups to logistics and export operations that exploit permissive Venezuelan spaces [4] [9].
5. Local criminal groups and Tren de Aragua
Domestic Venezuelan criminal organizations such as Tren de Aragua have been designated by the U.S. alongside foreign cartels; these groups operate locally and regionally, sometimes overlapping with smuggling, kidnapping and trafficking networks that feed larger transnational flows [4]. Tren de Aragua’s designation as an FTO by the U.S. signals Washington’s view that homegrown gangs have become part of international narcotics and violent networks [4].
6. What the U.S. government claims versus skeptical expert views
The U.S. has escalated legal and rhetorical pressure—labeling Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization and tying Maduro and senior officials to trafficking—measures that expand sanctions and possible military or coercive options [10] [4]. Some specialists and outlets argue the “Cartel de los Soles” term risks oversimplifying a diffuse pattern of corruption, and say evidence for a single, top‑down cartel run by Maduro is disputed in parts of the expert community [5] [6].
7. Legal, operational and policy consequences of these characterizations
Designations and accusations matter: U.S. sanctions and FTO labels change diplomatic options, financial targeting and military planning; they also influence regional governments’ responses and local economies—sometimes with immediate humanitarian and security fallout in coastal towns used by traffickers [4] [11]. Critics warn militarized strikes focusing on Venezuelan boats or facilities risk hitting low‑level operatives while leaving the larger Colombian‑Mexican production and distribution networks intact [8].
8. Limits of available reporting and remaining questions
Available sources document strong links among Venezuelan officials, Colombian armed groups and Mexican cartels in trafficking networks, but they also say that centralised command-of-production claims—particularly the idea that Venezuela is the primary origin of continental cocaine or fentanyl—are not uniformly supported and are actively disputed by experts and some reporting [9] [8] [5]. Not found in current reporting: concrete, universally accepted proof that Maduro personally directs an integrated cocaine‑production and export enterprise inside Venezuela beyond the indictments and policy assertions cited by U.S. authorities [4] [10].
In short: Colombian producers supply most cocaine; Venezuela serves as a permissive transit, processing and export environment enabling operation by corrupt military/security actors (the so‑called Cartel de los Soles), Colombian armed groups and Mexican cartels; the degree of centralised, presidential control over that activity remains disputed between U.S. officials and many independent analysts [9] [4] [5].