How did the Federal Court rule in Wertheim v Haddad and what legal tests did it apply to antisemitic speech?

Checked on February 5, 2026
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Executive summary

The Federal Court in Wertheim v Haddad found that multiple lectures by Sydney preacher Wissam (William) Haddad breached section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act by conveying “fundamentally racist and antisemitic” imputations about Jewish people and ordered offending material removed from social media and restrained future public repetition [1] [2] [3]. The Court applied the statutory test for racial vilification under s 18C, rejected the defendants’ s 18D defences and constitutional free‑speech challenges, and drew a clear legal line between unlawful antisemitic vilification and lawful criticism of the state of Israel [4] [5] [6].

1. The factual and procedural background that framed the judgment

The case arose from five recorded addresses given by Haddad at the Al Madina Dawah Centre in November 2023, some of which were uploaded to social media and later sued by Peter Wertheim and Robert Goot on behalf of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry as acts reasonably likely to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate Jewish people in Australia [4] [7] [2].

2. The Federal Court’s core finding on the content of the speeches

Justice Angus Stewart concluded the speeches “conveyed disparaging imputations” including age‑old tropes portraying Jews as treacherous, mischievous and conspiratorial, which the judge described as “fundamentally racist and antisemitic” and “devastatingly offensive and insulting” to Jewish Australians [1] [3] [2].

3. The statutory legal test the Court applied: section 18C of the RDA

The Court applied s 18C’s threshold — whether the conduct was reasonably likely to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate a person or group because of race or ethnic origin — and upheld 25 pleaded imputations across three of the five speeches, consolidating them into established imputations that satisfied s 18C(a) [3] [4].

4. Defences considered and rejected: section 18D and constitutional claims

Haddad and the Al Madina Dawah Centre relied on s 18D defences that protect statements made reasonably and in good faith for a genuine public interest purpose and on implied constitutional freedoms, but the Court rejected those defences as inapplicable or not made reasonably and in good faith in the circumstances [7] [5] [4].

5. The Court’s treatment of political speech and criticism of Israel

Crucially, the judgment distinguished legitimate political criticism of Israel from antisemitic vilification: passages targeting the conduct of Israel, the IDF and “Zionist entities” were found not to be about Jewish people generally and therefore did not breach the RDA, leading the Court to state “it is not antisemitic to criticise Israel” while simultaneously holding that blaming Jews as a people for Israel’s actions is antisemitic [1] [6] [8].

6. Evidence, expert witnesses and the Court’s reasoning about religion and context

The Court heard expert evidence (including from Islamic scholars and antisemitism specialists) and accepted that neither the Qur’an nor Hadith teach inherent hatred of Jews, but concluded Haddad failed to distinguish ancient scriptural passages about historic tribes from contemporary Jewish communities, thereby converting theological material into racialised imputations [9] [10] [1].

7. Remedies, costs and wider reactions

The orders required removal of the offending lectures where possible, restrained Haddad and the centre from conveying the established imputations publicly other than in private, required corrective notices on social media, and ordered the respondents to pay the applicants’ costs; Jewish community leaders welcomed the ruling as accountability for hate speech while some commentators highlighted implications for campus IHRA definitions and free‑speech debates [3] [2] [11].

8. What the decision means for future boundaries of speech law in Australia

The judgment reinforces that Australian courts will apply s 18C’s objective test to online and religiously‑framed speech, insist on good‑faith public‑interest defences under s 18D, and preserve space for robust political criticism of states like Israel so long as it does not equate to racial vilification of Jewish people — a balancing act likely to shape future disputes over protest, religion and online publication [4] [6] [12].

Want to dive deeper?
What is section 18C and 18D of Australia’s Racial Discrimination Act and how have courts interpreted them?
How do Australian courts distinguish legitimate political criticism of Israel from antisemitic speech?
What remedies have Australian courts ordered in other racial vilification cases involving online publication?