What Bivens claims are accepted

1. What “Bivens claims” historically meant — the original holding

Bivens began in 1971 when the Supreme Court held that a person could sue federal agents for damages for a Fourth Amendment violation — the arrest and warrantless search in Webster Bivens’s case — thereby recognizing an implied constitutional tort remedy against individual federal officers ^{[8] [9]}. Legal summaries and court materials frame Bivens as a narrow, judge‑created damages cause of action available where a federal officer’s conduct violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights ^{[10] [8]}.

2. The three recognized Bivens contexts the Court has accepted

The Court has accepted damages remedies in only three discrete scenarios: the original Fourth Amendment physical‑force/unreasonable search context (Bivens), a sex‑discrimination employment context (Davis), and an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care in prison context (Carlson) — a triplet that later decisions treat as the baseline for deciding whether a new case is sufficiently similar to permit extension ^{[4] [5]}.

3. The Ziglar framework: how courts decide whether to extend Bivens

Since Ziglar v. Abbasi ^[11] courts apply a two‑step framework: first ask whether the claim arises in a “new context” — i.e., is it meaningfully different from the three existing Bivens scenarios — and if it is, then consider whether “special factors” counsel hesitation (institutional, separation‑of‑powers, or systemic policy reasons) that make the judiciary reluctant to create a damages remedy that Congress might better craft ^{[5] [12]}.

4. Post‑Ziglar decline and recent reinforcement — Egbert/Boule and lower courts

The Supreme Court and lower courts have repeatedly declined to extend Bivens under Ziglar. Egbert v. Boule (and related 2022–2025 rulings) refused to extend Bivens to new contexts and signaled that claims not “highly similar” to the three exemplars will likely fail; SCOTUSblog and other analyses report a steady pattern of courts treating many proposed Bivens claims as novel and unprovable under the implied‑remedy doctrine ^{[4] [6]}. Ninth Circuit jury‑instruction materials and recent opinions explain that courts dismiss excessive‑force or surveillance claims when they create “systemwide consequences” or involve institutional considerations that counsel against a judicially implied remedy ^[7].

5. Practical contours: when practitioners still bring Bivens claims

Practitioners still draft Bivens complaints in Fourth Amendment search/seizure or closely parallel excessive‑force claims — and some circuits have allowed Bivens to proceed in fact patterns judged materially indistinguishable — but success depends heavily on similarity to the three accepted contexts, the absence of an alternative statutory remedy, and the judge’s view of special factors ^{[5] [10]}. Recent practice guides and court instruction sources warn that even minor factual or institutional differences (e.g., location of conduct, agency role, availability of administrative or statutory alternatives) often push a case into “new context” territory that will be dismissed ^{[13] [7]}.

6. Competing viewpoints and hidden agendas in the debate

Advocates for preserving Bivens argue courts must provide damages remedies when Congress has not — particularly to deter unconstitutional conduct and give victims meaningful relief ^[5]. Skeptics and several Justices argue that creating broad judicially implied damages remedies intrudes on Congress’s lawmaking role; they point to separation‑of‑powers and potential systemic consequences as reasons to leave new causes of action to Congress ^{[6] [9]}. Law‑review and advocacy pieces tilt on both sides — some assert courts should protect constitutional rights through Bivens while others emphasize judicial restraint and deference to legislative remedies ^{[14] [15]}.

7. Limits of current reporting and what’s not covered

Available sources do not mention every circuit split or all post‑2023 district‑court decisions applying Ziglar; granular win‑rate statistics by claim type are summarized in academic work but not exhaustively in the provided items ^{[4] [14]}. If you want targeted examples (cases that survived motions to dismiss or appellate reversals) or circuit‑by‑circuit treatment after 2023, request a focused search and I will pull those decisions from the available reporting.

Conclusion: Courts today accept only the narrow, historically recognized Bivens categories and will refuse to extend the remedy to claims that are not highly similar; whether a particular factual claim will qualify turns on the Ziglar “new context” and “special factors” analysis and on whether Congress or statute offers an alternative remedy ^{[4] [5] [7]}.