Who is typically targeted in illicit internet usage cases? are small offenders ever targeted
Executive summary
Law enforcement and criminal actors online focus on high-value and vulnerable targets: organizations, critical infrastructure, and high-net-worth individuals, while mass scams and automated attacks sweep up ordinary users who reuse credentials—IC3 logged 859,532 complaints and over $16 billion in losses in 2024 [1]. Cybercriminal toolkits and nation-state campaigns also target developers, software supply chains and hosting infrastructure to scale impact [2] [3].
1. Who the big actors go after — “jackpots and infrastructure”
Major cybercrime campaigns concentrate on organizations, critical services and valuable online assets because that yields the largest payoff; ransomware and supply‑chain attacks hit hospitals, corporations and vendors to seize billions in extortion or data (IC3’s $16+ billion reported losses show the scale of such incidents) [1]. Malware families and advanced persistent threats target software developers and cloud hosting to gain broad access—Censys found campaigns like BeaverTail targeting developers and job seekers to deliver data‑stealing backdoors and observed CL0P and Termite exploiting file‑transfer vulnerabilities against organizations [2] [3].
2. Low-hanging fruit: everyday people are targeted en masse
Criminals use automated techniques such as credential stuffing—testing leaked username/password pairs across many sites—to exploit people who reuse passwords, making ordinary internet users frequent targets [4]. IC3’s complaint volume—859,532 reports in 2024—signals that scams and frauds disproportionately affect everyday users, not just elite targets [1]. Firms monitoring malicious infrastructure emphasize that broad automation (bots, fake accounts, mule recruitment) is central to contemporary fraud [4] [2].
3. Small offenders and opportunistic actors — are they targeted by authorities?
Available sources describe large, coordinated takedowns (for example, the UK’s Operation Morpheus removing pirated Cobalt Strike instances with an 85% takedown rate), and cross‑border law enforcement actions to dismantle scam operations and botnets—efforts that go after both infrastructure and operating groups rather than every individual participant [2]. The FBI and partners report dismantling call centers, laundering networks and putting “hundreds of other actors behind bars,” which indicates focus on organized networks and operators behind large schemes [5]. Sources do not provide a clear description of routine targeting of tiny, one‑off internet offenders by law enforcement; not found in current reporting.
4. Why small or individual offenders can still draw attention
While law enforcement emphasizes large syndicates, automated scale and high losses, agencies also pursue fraud and laundering that cause significant harm: the IC3’s role and proactive initiatives like Operation Level Up show that actors who materially facilitate scams (mule networks, crypto laundering services) get investigated and sometimes prosecuted [5] [1]. Censys and other industry disruptions show that taking down commonly used tools (pirated Cobalt Strike, malicious VPS hosting) requires tracing many smaller operators and infrastructure elements, meaning low‑level actors can be swept up in broader operations [2] [3].
5. Private sector and tech ecosystems as both targets and enforcers
Hosting providers, VPS operators and app ecosystems end up as focal points because permissive or cheap infrastructure concentrates malicious activity; Censys notes geographic concentrations often reflect hosting availability and pricing more than geopolitical causation [3]. Industry and law enforcement collaborate to disrupt services, freeze scam wallets and trace funds—private cybersecurity firms like TRM Labs work alongside the FBI to track crypto flows and report billions in on‑chain fraud, illustrating a blended enforcement ecosystem [6] [5].
6. Two competing realities: scalability vs. selectivity
On one hand, attackers scale through automation to hit millions of small victims (credential stuffing, phishing), making “everyone” a viable target given global connectivity [4]. On the other hand, law enforcement resources and published operations reveal prioritization: high-loss schemes, organized networks and infrastructure control are targeted first, while many small incidents are handled via reporting systems, mitigation guidance and deterrence rather than individual prosecutions [1] [5]. Both dynamics coexist and explain why victims range from individual consumers to nation‑scale services.
7. What this means for individuals and small offenders
Individuals are frequent victims of automated scams and credential abuse; protecting reused passwords and recognizing phishing remain basic defenses emphasized by multiple reports [4] [1]. For small offenders: sources show law enforcement prioritizes networks and infrastructure operators, but participation in laundering, mule schemes, or operating high‑impact tools can bring legal exposure when tied to larger investigations [5] [2]. Sources do not give a full breakdown of prosecution rates for “small” internet offenses; not found in current reporting.
Limitations and reading advice: these sources focus on high‑level trends, large datasets and notable operations; they describe both mass victimization (IC3 complaint volumes and automated attacks) and targeted disruptions of infrastructure, but they do not provide granular statistics about how often individual low‑level offenders are prosecuted [1] [2]. For prosecution or clearance‑rate specifics on small offenders, consult detailed justice‑system datasets that were not included among the supplied sources (not found in current reporting).