Why does netherlands host so much CSAM?
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Executive summary
Recent analyses and NGO reports show the Netherlands hosts a very large share of Europe’s identified child sexual abuse material (CSAM): Childlight and multiple outlets report the country accounts for more than 60% of CSAM in Western Europe and roughly 30% of the world’s total by their 2024-based measure [1] [2]. Independent monitoring by the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) and Dutch government studies confirm the Netherlands consistently appears among the top global locations for CSAM hosting (IWF: 29% in 2024; Dutch monitoring finds large, fluctuating URL volumes) [3] [4].
1. Why the Netherlands keeps showing up: infrastructure and industry concentration
Multiple reports point to the Netherlands’ dense, high-quality internet infrastructure and a thriving hosting industry as key practical reasons many CSAM servers are located there: the country offers robust datacenter capacity, attractive hosting services and technical neutrality that make it a “destination of choice” for all sorts of content — including illicit content tracked by watchdogs [5] [6]. Independent monitors and hotlines note criminals exploit every hosting opportunity and weakness in detection and mitigation systems, and the Netherlands’ large hosting market simply concentrates more content that monitors can trace back to specific servers [3] [7].
2. Measurement, reporting and per‑capita framing change the picture
Different organizations use different methods: Childlight’s “CSAM rate” compares hosted material to population and reporting volumes and finds an exceptionally high per‑capita rate for the Netherlands (880.9 reports per 10,000 people) using 2024 INHOPE and NCMEC data [2]. The IWF’s independent counts show the Netherlands hosted 29% of IWF‑found CSAM URLs in 2024 (down from 33% in 2023) [3]. Those percentages depend on tracing server location, counting dynamic site moves, and which datasets are aggregated, so headline ranks reflect methodology as much as absolute levels [3] [4].
3. Law, policy and industry response — active but contested
Dutch authorities and industry actors have taken formal steps: public‑private roundtables, a 24‑hour removal norm for providers, new legal measures to require hosting companies to remove CSAM and proposals to hold providers to account are documented in government monitoring and NGO summaries [4] [7] [8]. Advocates argue the Netherlands is attempting to “take responsibility” and improve removal frameworks, while NGOs warn more forceful regulation (including EU‑level rules) may be needed to close remaining loopholes [5] [2].
4. Dynamics of reduction, displacement and counting artefacts
Dutch monitoring reports show the volume of reported URLs has fluctuated and declined in some periods but can rebound when criminal hosting migrates or detection improves; removing servers in one place can push content elsewhere or produce spikes in reports as hotlines find and flag material [4] [9]. INHOPE and IWF note that sites deliberately move hosting across countries to evade takedown; monitors continue to track migrating domains and count them each time they reappear, which can inflate perceived concentration if those migrations are concentrated in one country’s infrastructure [3] [7].
5. Recent NGO findings and media amplification
Childlight, Terre des Hommes and media outlets published high‑visibility reports in 2025 that re‑emphasized the Netherlands’ outsized share and translated monitoring counts into striking shares (over 60% of Western Europe; ~30% global) and per‑capita rates — figures now widely cited in press accounts [1] [2] [10]. These studies rely on INHOPE and NCMEC datasets and on specific rate calculations; outlets and advocacy groups use such framing to press for stronger national and EU measures [1] [11].
6. Competing narratives and limits of the evidence
Sources present two concurrent messages: watchdogs and NGOs document a high concentration of host‑traced CSAM in the Netherlands and call for tougher action [1] [2], while Dutch government and industry narratives stress active remediation, legal reforms and cooperation that have reduced some hosting volumes and improved response capacity [7] [4] [5]. The exact ranking and share depend on which dataset and time window are used — IWF reports a fall from 33% to 29% [3], while Childlight reports over 60% of Western Europe using its rate [1].
7. What’s missing or uncertain in current public reporting
Available sources do not mention granular forensic attribution of how much of the hosted content originates from domestic offenders versus foreign networks merely using Dutch infrastructure; they also do not provide a single, harmonised global dataset that reconciles IWF, INHOPE, NCMEC and NGO methods (not found in current reporting). That methodological gap means policy debates often hinge on different, partly overlapping counts [3] [2].
8. Bottom line: infrastructure plus measurement equals high visibility — and political urgency
The Netherlands’ large hosting sector and quality infrastructure concentrate content that international monitors can locate, and recent counts show the country at the top of several lists [3] [1]. Dutch authorities and NGOs agree the problem demands stronger technical, legal and transnational measures, even as they dispute interpretations and stress that shifts in hosting and detection affect headline numbers [4] [5] [2].