How have previous administrations treated Section 3 (temporary transfers) compared with the untested Section 4?

1. Section 3: a modest, repeatedly used administrative tool

Since ratification, presidents have invoked Section 3 to transfer authority temporarily in predictable medical circumstances: Ronald Reagan did so around surgery in 1985 (in practice or via prepared papers), George W. Bush invoked it twice for colonoscopies in 2002 and 2007, and Joe Biden used it for a brief procedure in 2021, illustrating that presidents treat Section 3 as a short, orderly handoff to the vice presidency when the president anticipates incapacity from anesthesia or similar causes ^{[5] [2] [1] [6] [7]}.

2. Section 4: untested, legally ambiguous, politically explosive

By contrast, Section 4—authorizing the vice president plus a majority of the Cabinet (or another body Congress might designate) to declare the president unable to discharge duties—has never been invoked in U.S. history and remains largely theoretical in application ^{[1] [8] [9]}. The provision contemplates an involuntary substitution that triggers a subsequent congressional supermajority review, so it is built to be rare and hard to execute; its central term “inability” is not defined in the Constitution, leaving substantial legal and interpretive ambiguity about triggers and process ^{[3] [9]}.

3. Legal mechanics and the uphill political climb

The mechanics help explain practice: Section 3 is a unilateral, written declaration by the president that ends when the president transmits a contrary declaration, making it low‑stakes and reversible ^{[3] [1]}. Section 4, by design, requires the vice president and a Cabinet majority to act and then exposes the matter to Congress where two‑thirds of both chambers can be required to sustain an acting vice‑president—a procedure that is procedurally cumbersome and politically calibrated to be difficult to deploy even in severe cases ^{[4] [3] [9]}.

4. Political incentives, precedent and the risk calculus

Past administrations have been mindful of precedent, political incentives, and institutional risk: Reagan’s team prepared 25th Amendment papers after his 1981 shooting but did not ultimately effect a Section 4 transfer, demonstrating both the temptation and the reticence to use the involuntary mechanism in crisis ^{[6] [7] [8]}. Scholars and policymakers have warned that Section 4’s invocation would destabilize governance and could itself be weaponized as a partisan tool—an argument marshalled by those who caution against treating the clause as a remedy for unpopular or unwise behavior rather than true incapacity ^{[10] [3]}.

5. Contemporary debates, activism and institutional responses

Section 4’s mystique rose in public discussion during periods of intense partisan conflict—activists and some staffers have urged its use in modern eras—yet commentators and legal analysts stress its limits and intended narrow scope, arguing for better public education and clear statutory procedures before any real test occurs ^{[10] [3]}. Congress and presidential libraries have encouraged clarifying rules and contingency planning precisely because the clause’s political and legal costs are so high that governments prefer administrative fixes, medical transparency, or voluntary Section 3 transfers instead of invoking Section 4 ^{[7] [11] [9]}.

6. Bottom line

Previous administrations have normalized Section 3 as a routine, voluntary mechanism for temporary incapacity tied mainly to medical procedures, while Section 4 remains a constitutional emergency tool—never used, legally indeterminate in some respects, and politically prohibitive in practice—so the historical record shows practical comfort with Section 3 and near‑universal avoidance of Section 4 except in planning or theoretical debate ^{[1] [2] [8] [3]}.