What methodology did The Guardian use to identify 8,900 named fighters and what are its limitations?
Executive summary
The Guardian, working with +972 Magazine and Local Call, derived the figure of roughly 8,900 named “Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives” from an internal Israeli military intelligence database that lists more than 47,000 named individuals it classifies as fighters; the 8,900 represents those the database had marked as confirmed or “probably dead” by May [1]civilians-3205746" target="blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">[2]. The reporting makes clear the number is a product of named, database-verified entries and carries important caveats: it likely undercounts unnamed combatants and people who took part in hostilities without formal membership, and Israeli officials later contested the findings without offering a detailed rebuttal [2][1].
1. What source did The Guardian and partners analyze and how was the 8,900 figure produced
The investigation relied on an internal Israeli military intelligence database that tracks individuals identified as members or operatives of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad; that master list contains more than 47,000 named people classified as fighters, and investigators used the database’s status flags to count roughly 8,900 operatives recorded as confirmed dead or “probably dead” as of the May snapshot cited [1][2]. The Guardian’s partners — +972 Magazine and Hebrew-language Local Call — reported direct access to or examination of that internal dataset and used the database’s own named, individual-level entries rather than battlefield tallies or external mortality estimates [2].
2. The methodological strengths: named verification, institutional provenance, and internal classification
Using a state military intelligence database gives the figure institutional provenance: the count is not extrapolated from media reports or NGO tallies but emerges from an internal list the Israeli army itself maintains, with entries tied to names and classification fields, which reduces double-counting that can occur in aggregated public tallies [1][2]. The reporting therefore provides a lower-bound, name-verified perspective grounded in the army’s own administrative records rather than third-party reconstructions [2].
3. Key limitations documented by the reporting: scope, definitions and systematic undercounting
The database’s structure and the Guardian’s use of it impose major constraints: intelligence sources told reporters the list likely undercounts total fighters because it excludes unidentified combatants and civilians who fought without formal group membership, and because not every death on the battlefield gets linked to a named entry in the intelligence system [2]. In short, the 8,900 number reflects only those deaths that could be matched to named database entries, making it an incomplete measure of all personnel who fought or were killed while fighting [2].
4. Additional uncertainties: older databases, classification errors and institutional caveats
Investigative sources warned of other noise in the system: parts of the army — notably an older Southern Command database — reportedly produced inflated casualty estimates that were not name-verified, highlighting inconsistencies between different military systems [2]. After publication, Israeli officials initially did not dispute the database’s existence but later said they wanted to “rephrase” and called the figures “incorrect” without specifying which data or methods they contested, leaving gaps in official pushback and in the ability to fully validate or refute the investigators’ interpretation [2][1].
5. What this methodology cannot settle and why readers should treat the figure cautiously
Because the count is constrained to named, recorded entries, it cannot quantify anonymous or irregular combatants, cannot represent the total number of people who engaged in fighting, and cannot by itself adjudicate contested definitions of “fighter” versus civilian combatant; those caveats are acknowledged in the reporting and by intelligence sources who told the journalists the database excludes certain categories [2]. The reporting therefore yields a bounded, evidence-based claim about named entries in an Israeli system — valuable but partial — and is explicit that alternative tallies (higher or lower) can arise from different data sources, definitions, or administrative practices [1][2].
6. Alternative readings, agendas and transparency issues
The joint reporting exposes an internal metric that can cut both ways politically: it can be used to argue that many deaths in Gaza were civilian because the army’s own named-fighter list accounts for far fewer fatalities than total death counts, while defenders of Israeli operations might point to unnamed combatants, battlefield uncertainty, or different counting methodologies to argue the database underestimates fighters; the Israeli military’s non-specific rejection of the figures adds opacity rather than a transparent methodological rebuttal [2][1]. The investigators’ agenda — to test state claims against internal records — is explicit in the partnership between The Guardian, +972 Magazine and Local Call, but the limits of access to classified data and the military’s partial pushback mean the figure should be interpreted as a rigorously sourced—but inherently limited—indicator rather than a complete accounting [2][1].