Is the official U.S. Department of Homeland Security Twitter account managed from Israel?
Executive summary
Claims that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s official X (formerly Twitter) account was “managed from Israel” stem from a late‑November 2025 rollout of X’s “About This Account” location data that briefly produced screenshots and clips suggesting @DHSgov showed an Israeli location; X’s head of product says that was incorrect and that the DHS account “has only shown IPs from the United States since account creation,” and DHS itself said the account “has only ever been run and operated from the United States” [1] [2].
1. What people saw and why it went viral
A transparency update rolled out on X that displayed account‑creation country and login locations; shortly afterward, screenshots and short videos circulated claiming @DHSgov’s profile listed Tel Aviv or showed an Israeli IP/provider, which rapidly spread across social platforms and conservative circles, driving the viral controversy [3] [4] [5].
2. X’s official pushback: “misinformation” and manipulated media
Nikita Bier, X’s head of product, publicly described the specific claims about DHS being listed as based in Israel as “misinformation,” called the screenshots “manipulated media,” and said the location feature “was not available on any government accounts” and that DHS’s account “has only shown IPs from the United States since account creation” [1] [6].
3. DHS’s response and the immediate correction on platform
The Department of Homeland Security posted that its account “has only ever been run and operated from the United States” and initially answered the uproar with a meme before issuing a formal denial; X briefly removed or altered the feature’s behavior and later exempted government accounts from showing that location field [2] [7] [5].
4. Why some outlets and observers still reported an Israeli footprint
A number of outlets and social posts — including political and regional outlets — picked up screenshots or screen recordings that claimed to show @DHSgov registered via an Israeli IP or Partner Communications Ltd., and some commentators linked this to broader narratives around foreign influence or vendor relationships [8] [9] [10]. Those reports amplified suspicion even as platform and agency denials emerged.
5. Technical explanations reported by X and fact‑checkers
Reporting and X commentary indicated the rollout produced errors for a “very small subset of old accounts,” and that account‑creation country metadata can be incorrect for legacy accounts created before current instrumentation — X acknowledged inaccuracies affecting older profiles and said the erroneous display helped trigger the confusion [6] [11].
6. Competing narratives and political context
Some commentaries and partisan outlets framed the episode as proof of foreign control or infiltration, while mainstream fact‑checks and platform officials framed it as a product bug or manipulated media; this dispute maps onto wider political debates about X’s transparency tools, U.S.–Israel relations, and mistrust of institutions [12] [11] [8]. Both narratives used the same artifacts (screenshots/clips) but reached opposite conclusions.
7. What the available sources do — and do not — establish
Available sources consistently record the viral screenshots and videos, X’s product‑team denial that DHS was listed as based in Israel, and DHS’s statement it operates the account from the U.S.; several reports say the feature briefly showed problematic data and was then changed or removed [1] [2] [5]. Available sources do not mention independent forensic verification publicly confirming that the DHS account was actually operated from Israel at any time; where outlets report an Israeli IP, platform officials directly dispute that assertion [8] [6].
8. Takeaway for readers evaluating such claims
Given X’s acknowledgement of incorrect metadata for a subset of older accounts and public denials from both X’s product head and DHS that the account was run from Israel, the strongest conclusion supported by current reporting is that the viral claim resulted from erroneous location data and manipulated screenshots/videos rather than verifiable evidence of DHS being managed from Israel [6] [1] [2]. However, persistent reporting of opposing data points means some observers will remain unconvinced; the disagreement hinges on whether you give priority to platform and agency denials or to third‑party captures that some outlets published [8] [9].
Limitations: this assessment uses only the provided reporting and statements; independent technical log audits or a public forensic trace of DHS login IP history are not included in the cited sources and therefore not available to confirm or refute the claim beyond the platform and agency statements [1] [2].