Why does the media always portray republicans as the bad guys and democrats as the good guys? And why is it spreading to Europe?

Checked on January 28, 2026
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Executive summary

The claim that “the media always portrays Republicans as the bad guys and Democrats as the good guys” overstates both the evidence and what scholars find: empirical studies show mixed patterns of partisan slant, persistent perceptions of bias, and strong partisan sorting of outlets and audiences that magnify those perceptions [1] [2] [3]. The appearance of a single-sided narrative is driven less by an orchestrated liberal conspiracy than by structural news routines, audience-driven media markets, selective examples amplified on social media, and the transnational circulation of U.S. political stories—factors documented across academic and journalistic reporting [4] [5] [6].

1. What people mean by “media always portrays” and why that phrasing is misleading

Complaints about media bias usually conflate three distinct claims—systematic editorial slant, selective story choice, and audience perception—but research finds no single answer: some mainstream newscasts skewed more critical of Republicans in one dataset, while other analyses find little meaningful liberal bias in story selection by journalists [1] [7]. Public opinion polling shows Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say news organizations are politically biased, a durable perception that predates recent cycles [2].

2. The empirical record: mixed evidence, not a consensus

Large-scale tonality studies of U.S. newscasts from 2001–2012 detected tendencies for ABC/CBS/NBC to be slightly more critical of Republicans and for Fox to be more critical of Democrats, illustrating outlet heterogeneity rather than a monolithic media stance [1]. Other correspondence and experimental work argues journalists’ personal liberal leanings do not translate into systematic suppression of conservative stories, allowing researchers to “rule out any meaningful levels of liberal media bias” on story choice in some contexts [7]. Academics remain divided because methods, time periods, and measures (tone vs. volume vs. framing) produce different results [8] [9].

3. Structural drivers that make one side look worse in headlines

News values—novelty, conflict, scandal—and the competitive pressure to cover drama push outlets toward critical, negative reporting when a party is associated with controversy, which can register as asymmetric coverage if one party is more frequently the site of scandal at a given moment [9] [1]. Social media and moderation choices also shape what people see and complain about: enforcement actions against false claims tied to one political faction can create both genuine visibility gaps and the impression of censorship among that faction’s supporters [4] [10].

4. Audience segmentation, partisan media, and incentives

The rise of ideologically targeted outlets and partisan watchdogs—on both left and right—means consumers can live in news diets that confirm their biases; this business model rewards outrage and attribution of bad intent to the other side, reinforcing the narrative that “the media” is hostile to one’s party even when coverage is mixed across the ecosystem [3] [11]. Polling shows both sides see bias in the other; partisan moral judgments about opponents further intensify that perception [3] [2].

5. Why the U.S. pattern is “spreading” to Europe—flows, frames, and striking personalities

European outlets increasingly cover U.S. politics and the friction around it, and scholars note that European coverage often frames high-profile American events in ways that emphasize democratic norms and conflict—thus carrying U.S. partisan narratives into European discourse [6]. Moreover, platform dynamics and global social media mean controversies and moderation debates originating in the U.S. are replicated or adapted in other countries, creating cross-border perceptions of media partisanship even where local conditions differ [4].

6. Bottom line: perception, not unanimity; watch methods and incentives

There is robust evidence that perceptions of media bias are widespread and asymmetric (Republicans report greater distrust), and empirical studies show mixed results on whether outlets systematically portray Republicans as “bad” and Democrats as “good” depending on measures and time windows [2] [1] [7]. Any definitive claim that “the media always” portrays one party as morally superior runs beyond the evidence; instead the dynamics are complex: outlet differences, newsroom routines, audience demand, and social platforms combine to produce episodes that look one-sided in public debate [8] [5]. This account relies on the cited literature; gaps remain where cross-national empirical studies directly comparing media slant in Europe and the U.S. over the last five years are not available in the provided reporting [6] [4].

Want to dive deeper?
How do news values like scandal and conflict shape political coverage?
What methods do scholars use to measure media bias and why do they produce different results?
How has social media moderation influenced perceptions of bias among conservative audiences?