How did the 1969 draft lottery change who was actually sent to Vietnam compared with pre‑lottery deferment practices?

1. The pre‑1969 system: channeling manpower through deferments

Before the lottery, the Selective Service used a deferment and exemption regime to “channel” manpower into civilian and military roles deemed important, a system that disproportionately favored college students, fathers, and those with occupations deemed essential, resulting in working‑class and minority men bearing a larger share of combat risk ^{[1] [5] [6]}. By 1969 paternity (III‑A) and student (II‑S) deferments were widespread — over four million men held paternity deferments that year, more than twice the number with education deferments — which created tangible incentives to enroll in school or start families to avoid being classified 1‑A and sent to Vietnam ^[7].

2. What the 1969 lottery did, in practice

On December 1, 1969, the Selective Service drew birth dates to assign a random order for call‑up among men born 1944–1950, so that all men sharing a birthday would have the same draft priority and the earliest numbers would be called first for induction ^{[2] [8]}. The stated purpose was to reduce the perceived bias of the old system by introducing a random element into selection, moving policy from age‑based calls toward birth‑date priority ^{[2] [5]}.

3. Who was more likely to be sent after the lottery

The lottery made 19‑year‑olds the first group most likely to be called, reversing the pre‑1969 tendency for older men near age 26 to be drafted first, and thereby concentrating immediate conscription risk on younger cohorts who no longer had the same temporal protection from earlier age‑based selection ^[3]. For many cohorts, whether a man actually served still depended on his lottery number plus existing deferments: student deferments remained available and those in college knew their lottery number would determine whether they faced service once their enrollment‑based protection expired ^{[9] [1]}.

4. Why disparity persisted despite the appearance of randomness

Although the lottery aimed at fairness, it did not eliminate structural advantages: college deferments and other exemptions continued, wealthier registrants could still use education, occupational placements, or the National Guard to avoid overseas combat, and critics noted clustering in the draw that raised questions about true randomness ^{[4] [1] [2]}. Moreover, non‑lottery maneuvers — fleeing to Canada, failing aptitude tests, or securing politically connected Guard slots — remained effective escape routes, so socioeconomic status and networks still influenced who ultimately served ^{[10] [4]}.

5. Political intent, consequences and contested legitimacy

Nixon and Congress moved to a lottery in part to defuse accusations that the draft was biased and to signal a shift toward a fairer system while managing domestic unrest; yet the change intensified anti‑war sentiment when the public saw the lottery as arbitrary and imperfectly random, fueling protests and continued claims of unfairness ^{[4] [2]}. The administration later curtailed some deferments (for example, by executive order abolishing paternity and certain occupational exceptions in 1970), indicating that policymakers recognized the lottery alone did not resolve equity problems in conscription ^[7].

6. Bottom line: a meaningful procedural change that left substantive inequalities

The 1969 lottery altered who was called first—moving the focal point of risk to younger men and inserting a formal randomness into selection—but it did not fully change who actually served in Vietnam because longstanding deferments and socioeconomic escape routes remained in force and in practice continued to skew service toward less privileged men; the lottery reduced one form of bias while leaving other levers of avoidance intact ^{[3] [1] [7]}.