How did each administration approach military authorization, congressional oversight, and use-of-force memos?
Executive summary
Presidents have relied on a mix of broad authorizations, annual appropriations and classified legal memos while Congress has struggled to reassert oversight; the FY2025 NDAA authorized roughly $895 billion for defense and added new reporting and certification requirements that the Biden White House flagged as potentially implicating classified information [1] [2]. Scholars and watchdogs say post‑9/11 AUMFs and executive use‑of‑force memos expanded executive latitude and left Congress with limited, uneven oversight—Biden dialed back some operations but left legal foundations intact, and Congress has taken piecemeal steps to force more transparency [3] [4].
1. Authorizations and budgets: Congress still writes the checks
Congress retains primary control of defense funding and used the FY2025 NDAA to authorize about $895 billion in national defense spending and dozens of specific authorities — from shipbuilding to DARPA personnel assignments — making funding the principal lever over military posture [1] [5]. The NDAA process produced competing House and Senate texts and compromise language; conference text added new reporting mandates for capabilities such as lethal autonomous weapons and other requirements that increase congressional visibility into programs [6] [1].
2. Executive use-of-force memos: the opaque legal engine
Academic and policy reporting documents the central role of classified or internal legal memoranda—so‑called use‑of‑force memos—in authorizing targeted strikes and counterterror operations since 2001, empowering successive administrations to interpret broad AUMFs expansively [3] [7]. Available sources do not list specific Biden or Trump memos in these search results; they do show the pattern: memos and internal legal reasoning reduced transparency and complicated Congress’s ability to second‑guess kinetic operations [3] [7].
3. Biden administration: constrained operations, persistent legal scaffolding
Analysts say the Biden White House “dialled back operations somewhat” relative to the broad post‑9/11 approach while leaving the AUMF architecture largely intact, meaning the executive continued to rely on existing legal authorities and internal memos even as some policy choices shifted [3]. The Biden administration also engaged with Congress on the NDAA and warned that several statutory reporting demands could implicate highly sensitive classified information—an explicit executive branch concern about handing committees operational details [2].
4. Congressional oversight: fractured, incremental, and partisan
Multiple observers argue Congress has largely ceded practical control over long‑running counterterror authorities and oversight has been uneven and politicized; reform proposals and limited reporting requirements have met partisan headwinds and institutional inertia [3] [4]. The record shows committees continue to use the NDAA and other statutes to force reporting—e.g., annual lethal autonomous weapons lists and certifications—but oversight still depends on majority will, committee jurisdiction, and what classified material the executive will disclose [6] [3].
5. Institutional friction: classified information vs. congressional prerogative
The Biden statement on signing the FY2025 NDAA explicitly warned that sections “would require the President and other officials to submit certifications, reports, notifications, or plans to the Congress that may in the ordinary course, include highly sensitive classified information” [2]. This captures the perennial tension: Congress passes reporting mandates to regain visibility, the White House raises separation‑of‑powers and security arguments, and oversight becomes a negotiation over what information is safely shareable [2] [6].
6. Reform advocates: AUMF repeal vs. oversight capacity building
Policy analysts at Brookings and watchdogs contend that simply rewriting authorizations (for example, rescinding or narrowing the 2001/2002 AUMFs) is insufficient without strengthening Congress’s own oversight tools and incentives; they urge clearer sunsets and improved monitoring mechanisms to prevent open‑ended executive reach [4]. The International Crisis Group similarly calls for incremental steps to restore meaningful congressional scrutiny of kinetic authorities rather than relying solely on executive restraint [3].
7. What’s missing from the record and why it matters
Available sources do not provide a comprehensive catalog of internal use‑of‑force memos issued across administrations or granular, unclassified breakdowns of how those memos shaped specific operations (available sources do not mention full memos). That opacity matters: without publication or classified briefings to appropriate committees, Congress cannot fully evaluate legal rationales or adjust authorizations to evolving threats [3] [7].
8. Bottom line: money, memos, and messy oversight
Congress controls budgets and is using NDAA language and reporting requirements to claw back information [1] [6]. The executive continues to rely on inherited AUMFs and internal legal memos to justify force—Biden altered some practices but left legal frameworks largely in place—so any durable rebalancing will require both statutory authorization changes and institutional investment in congressional oversight capacity [3] [4].