What is the impact of integrating new AESA radars on sortie rates and reliability for Gripen vs Typhoon?
Executive summary
Integrating modern AESA radars improves detection range, electronic-attack and multitasking capabilities for both Gripen and Typhoon, but the reporting does not provide direct, comparable metrics on sortie rates or fleet-level reliability after integration (available sources do not mention sortie-rate or reliability figures). The Gripen uses the Raven ES-05/Raven family AESA with flight tests and production use cited [1] [2] [3], while Typhoon is being fitted with the ECRS/ECRS Mk2 (Captor‑E/ ECRS Mk2) with UK funding and rollout plans for selected Tranche 3 aircraft [4] [5] [6].
1. AESA upgrades: what each program is delivering
Saab’s Raven family AESA is described as the intended X‑band AESA for Gripen NG/E and there is public documentation of flight testing and production intent — Leonardo/Finmeccanica and Saab partnerships date back to the Gripen NG demonstrator and Saab has continued to test and field Raven‑type AESA systems on Gripen demonstrators and production aircraft [3] [2] [7]. For Eurofighter/Typhoon, the UK and industry have developed the European Common Radar System (ECRS/ECRS Mk2, also reported as Captor‑E/Captor‑E derivatives), with ground testing, prototype deliveries and funded long‑lead procurement for retrofit to 40 Tranche‑3 Typhoons and planned deliveries for integration from 2028 onward [4] [5] [6].
2. Claimed capability changes that could affect sorties
AESA radars offer longer detection ranges, electronically steered beams, greater multitasking (simultaneous search/track and electronic attack) and lower probability of intercept compared with mechanically scanned arrays — capabilities described in multiple program writeups and radar histories [8] [2] [4]. These mission-capability enhancements can reduce mission time spent reacquiring targets and allow more effective tactics, which in principle could increase effective sortie utility per flight hour. However, none of the cited materials quantify resulting changes in sortie rate per aircraft or mission‑capable rates after fleet retrofit (available sources do not mention concrete sortie-rate or reliability statistics post‑integration).
3. Reliability and maintainability signals in reporting
Gripen’s PS‑05/A legacy radar is noted for in‑service reliability and field‑upgrade paths (Hungary reporting good reliability for PS‑05 sets, and Saab promoting modular/LRU benefits and AESA upgradeability for PS‑05 Mk4) [8] [9]. Saab also publicly flew and tested its GaN AESA demonstrator and positioned the AESA as an upgrade option — signalling a design intent toward modularity and field supportability [10] [3]. For Typhoon, reporting focuses on integration planning, radome modifications and long‑lead procurement; the ECRS Mk2 is being developed with electronic‑attack capability and field trials, but program texts emphasize system complexity and multinational procurement rather than in‑service reliability numbers [4] [5]. Direct, comparable maintenance‑burden or mean‑time‑between‑failure data are not provided (available sources do not mention quantified reliability comparisons).
4. Operational tempo and sortie-rate drivers beyond radar type
Sortie rates and fleet reliability are driven by multiple non‑radar factors that the provided reporting highlights elsewhere or implies: service logistics and maintenance practices, availability of spares and long‑lead items (the UK funding for long‑lead radar components is cited), platform life‑cycle status (Tranche differences in Typhoon), and mission planning/sensor fusion ecosystems [5] [6] [4]. For Gripen, Saab’s emphasis on modular LRUs and upgrade paths suggests lower‑complexity field upgrades could favour maintainability [9] [3]. For Typhoon, introducing a higher‑power AESA plus a new radome and EA/SEAD functions implies significant integration work that can temporarily suppress sortie availability during retrofit cycles [4] [5].
5. Competing perspectives and implicit agendas
Manufacturer and defence‑industry sources (Saab, Leonardo, FlightGlobal reporting) naturally frame AESA programs as capability leaps and potential export advantages — incentives exist to highlight operational upside [7] [2] [4]. National procurement reporting (UK MoD funding announcements) highlights readiness and force‑advantage narratives that justify budgets and schedule targets [5] [6]. Independent program metrics that would settle sortie‑rate impacts are not present in the supplied reporting (available sources do not mention independent sortie‑rate studies or post‑retrofit operational metrics).
6. Bottom line for readers seeking comparisons
Both Gripen and Typhoon will gain significant radar capability from AESA integration — better range, multitasking and electronic‑attack options — but the sources do not supply the specific sortie‑rate or reliability statistics needed to say which aircraft will see bigger increases in sorties or operational availability (available sources do not mention quantitative sortie-rate or reliability outcomes). To get a defensible, numeric comparison you will need operational readiness and maintenance data from operator air forces or independent evaluators, which are not included in the provided sources.