What are the realistic scenarios for Arctic sovereignty disputes between the U.S., Canada, and other states?
Executive summary
Melting ice has turned theoretical lines on maps into tangible stakes — shipping through the Northwest Passage, potential hydrocarbon prizes in the Beaufort Sea, and overlapping continental-shelf claims all create pressure points between Canada, the United States and other Arctic states [1] [2] [3]. Most plausible disputes are diplomatic and legal fights over maritime delimitation and shipping rules; high‑intensity armed conflict remains a low-probability but politically charged scenario amplified by domestic politics and strategic posturing [4] [5] [6].
1. What’s actually at stake: law, resources and routes
Sovereignty in the Arctic is governed by maritime zones under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and by continental‑shelf submissions, which leave large areas of the central Arctic technically unowned while coastal states press claims over adjacent seas and the seabed where resources and shipping lanes may emerge [7] [8] [3]. The prize is not just oil and gas — widely discussed as significant though technically challenging to exploit — but shorter transits (Northwest Passage) and control of regulatory regimes that will govern fishing, search-and-rescue and environmental standards [1] [2] [3].
2. The most realistic, near‑term disputes: Beaufort Sea, Northwest Passage, Hans Island
The most immediate, probable flashpoints are unresolved boundaries of the Beaufort Sea between Canada and the U.S., Canada’s claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters versus U.S. insistence on international‑strait status, and small sovereignty issues like Hans Island; all three are primarily diplomatic and legal friction points rather than military crises [9] [1] [4]. Domestic incidents — such as U.S. lease proposals by BOEM touching contested areas — can inflame public rhetoric and force diplomatic responses, but the underlying disputes are amenable to negotiation because extraction costs and operational challenges reduce the urgency for outright conflict [2].
3. Resource competition and constrained escalation
Major oil companies and some analysts point to large undiscovered hydrocarbon estimates in the Arctic, which feeds the narrative that resource competition could spark confrontation, especially over the Beaufort Sea [1]. Yet technocratic realities — extreme costs, environmental rules, lack of infrastructure and climate-policy headwinds — make rapid resource exploitation unlikely, lowering the chance that energy alone will trigger armed conflict and creating incentives for negotiated delimitation or joint development [2] [5].
4. High‑profile, low‑probability scenarios: Greenland, Svalbard and great‑power brinkmanship
Spectacular scenarios — an American move on Greenland, Russian moves on Svalbard, or outright annexation — circulate in media and policy debate and have been stoked by political actions (e.g., U.S. congressional proposals and rhetoric around Greenland) but remain politically fraught, legally weak and likely to provoke diplomatic and allied pushback if attempted [6] [10] [11]. Commentators warn that such narratives can be used instrumentally to justify domestic policies or military postures; analysts caution these remain improbable compared with incremental tensions over maritime rules [8] [9].
5. Indigenous rights, mobility and hidden fault lines
A less‑reported but consequential source of dispute runs through Indigenous transnational mobility and land‑use rights: Inuit communities’ traditional lands cross modern borders, and legal claims and mobility rights (as discussed in Canadian jurisprudence) could complicate state‑to‑state solutions or demand novel governance models that transcend simple sovereignty claims [12]. This dynamic reframes some disputes away from zero‑sum resource grabs toward negotiations over rights, access and co‑management.
6. How disputes are likely to be managed — and how they could worsen
The most realistic path is continued diplomacy, use of international legal channels (continental-shelf submissions, delimitation talks), bilateral agreements and limited joint‑development arrangements; political will and mutual interest in stability favor negotiated outcomes for the Beaufort Sea and the Northwest Passage [2] [1] [13]. Disputes could worsen if domestic politics weaponizes Arctic rhetoric, if unilateral resource licensing (e.g., BOEM actions) provokes reciprocity, or if third‑party actors exploit ambiguity — but scholars warn that catastrophic military escalation is unlikely and that fear framing can itself become a driver of unnecessary militarization [2] [9] [13].