What do Border Patrol reports say about wall effectiveness in stopping crossings 2017-2021?
Executive summary
Border Patrol and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) materials portray the wall as an effective component of a broader “system” that—when paired with technology, roads and agents—helps impede and redirect crossings and improve detection; CBP and DHS reported rising “effectiveness” measures in 2021 versus 2020 in most sectors (with exceptions such as San Diego and Tucson) [1] [2]. Independent watchdogs and news reporting note frequent breaches and adaptation by smugglers—The Washington Post (quoted on Wikipedia) reported hundreds to more than a thousand recorded breaches in FY2019–FY2021—and multiple GAO/OIG reviews say DHS’s metrics and models need improvement before definitive causal claims can be made [3] [4] [5].
1. What Border Patrol and DHS say: the wall is a force-multiplier within a “system”
CBP’s public messaging consistently frames the border wall not as a standalone fix but as the anchor of a “border wall system” combining high barriers, sensors, lighting, roads and agents; CBP asserts that this combination “impede[s] and deny[s] illegal crossings” and that new bollard-style barriers and prototypes were tested to identify the most effective designs [1] [6]. DHS similarly argued in 2020 that “effective physical infrastructure works to secure our Southwest Border” and that placing barriers in high-priority urban areas lets Border Patrol “decide where border crossings take place” [7].
2. What Border Patrol agents report: practical, frontline views that emphasize deterrence
Multiple CBP and advocacy accounts cite frontline agents who say barriers change the operational environment—slowing or preventing mass group crossings, channeling flows, and giving agents time to respond; agents and union surveys have also expressed strong support for more physical barriers as necessary in “strategic locations” [1] [8] [3]. CBP statements highlight examples (San Diego sector) where barriers pushed crossings into places where detection and interdiction are more feasible [1] [9].
3. Indicators and internal metrics: “effectiveness” rose in 2021 but with caveats
DHS’s 2022 Border Security Metrics Report (covering 2021 data) states that the “effectiveness rate” increased in 2021 across nearly all sectors compared to 2020—except San Diego and Tucson, which declined—while Rio Grande Valley showed the largest gain [2]. However, DHS’s modeling and reporting have limits: GAO found DHS did not update its deterrence model between 2016 and 2021 and recommended improvements to metrics reporting, and a DHS OIG review flagged technology and manpower challenges that affect situational awareness and assessment of effectiveness [5] [4].
4. Breaches and adaptation: recorded cuttings, climbs and tool use
Reporting cited in available material documents numerous breaches and adaptations by smugglers. Wikipedia’s summary of Washington Post reporting cites CBP maintenance records noting repeated sawing-through and recorded breach counts—891 in FY2019, 906 in FY2020 and 1,475 in FY2021—illustrating that barriers are regularly targeted and that smugglers use power tools, ladders and ropes to defeat designs [3]. CBP acknowledges in its own frontline pieces that battery-powered cutting tools and ladders have reduced some fence effectiveness and that newer designs aim to be harder to defeat [1].
5. Independent oversight and journalists: mixed conclusions, need for better causal evidence
GAO and other oversight bodies emphasize that while barriers can change where people attempt crossings, DHS reporting is incomplete on causal links between specific barrier projects and overall migration or drug flow outcomes. GAO recommended more rigorous measures and better transparency; BBC and others note it is unclear how much the wall alone drove declines in some categories of crossings, pointing to other policy measures as co-contributors [10] [5] [9].
6. Conflicting narratives and implicit agendas
Federal agencies (CBP/DHS) and pro-wall groups highlight operational gains and agent testimony to justify continued construction and funding [1] [7] [11]. Conversely, watchdogs and some journalists stress limitations in DHS’s metrics or point to environmental, legal and social harms; partisan outlets and advocacy groups selectively emphasize breach counts or apprehension spikes to support policy stances, so claims about “the wall worked” or “the wall failed” are often presented with advocacy-driven framing [3] [12] [13].
7. Bottom line for 2017–2021 reporting
Available Border Patrol and DHS sources assert that barriers, as part of a system, improved detection and operational control in many locations and that measured “effectiveness” increased in 2021 in most sectors, but those claims coexist with documented breaches, agent reports of smugglers adapting, and GAO/OIG findings that DHS’s models and metrics need strengthening before one can definitively attribute changes in crossings solely to the wall [1] [2] [3] [5] [4].
Note: Available sources do not mention precise, independently validated causal estimates that isolate the wall’s effect on total crossings across the entire border for 2017–2021; GAO and DHS reports recommend improved metrics to support such claims [5] [2].