Can ukraine win the war on russia by itself
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Executive summary
Ukraine cannot be separated from the international political, economic and military context in assessing whether it can “win” against Russia on its own: Russia occupies almost 20% of Ukrainian territory and Russia’s forces have made measurable territorial gains in 2025, while both sides have sustained very high casualties and Russia continues heavy long-range attacks that degrade Ukrainian infrastructure (Russian occupation ~19–20% [1]; Russia gained 0.77% of Ukrainian territory in 2025 and has made recent local gains such as near Hulyaipole and Kupyansk [2] [3] [4]). Western diplomacy and aid are central to current ceasefire/peace negotiations and to Ukraine’s ability to hold and retake ground (discussions and frozen Russian assets cited in ISW and reporting on diplomacy [5] [4] [6]).
1. The battlefield reality: attrition, limited Ukrainian-only options
Open-source battlefield assessments show a grinding, drone-dominated conflict in which Russia has still mounted localized breakthroughs—Hulyaipole and other sectors—and Moscow increased territorial control in late 2025, even if modest by percentage in 2025 (0.77% gain in 2025) [2] [3]. Ukrainian defenses leverage drones and tactics that degrade Russian maneuver, but Russia’s continuing missile and drone barrages—hundreds of weapons in single nights—sustain pressure on Ukrainian logistics and energy infrastructure, complicating a purely Ukrainian strategic breakout (495 and 704 missiles/drones reported overnight in December assessments) [5] [7].
2. Human and materiel costs: why “by itself” matters politically and practically
Both sides have endured massive casualties and material losses; available reporting lists very high casualty tallies and wide-ranging attrition estimates, with analysts noting hundreds of thousands killed or wounded on both sides, and estimates of Russian and Ukrainian casualties vary across sources (Russia and Ukraine casualty figures summarized in reporting) [8]. High attrition amplifies Ukraine’s need for replenishment, training, advanced munitions and air-defence capacity—resources that, in current reporting, are tied to Western support and financial mechanisms, not unilateral Ukrainian replenishment [8] [4].
3. Economics and strategic sustainment: Moscow’s durability and external leverage
Russia continues to generate revenue from fossil fuels and reportedly maintains large manpower pools and legal frameworks for mobilization—factors that allow prolonged operations even under sanctions and demographic strain (reporting on Russian mobilization law and economic resilience narratives) [2] [9]. The EU’s decision to freeze Russian assets to provide reparations/loans to Ukraine demonstrates Western fiscal leverage that materially affects Ukraine’s capacity to sustain long-term defense and reconstruction—an axis of support not replaceable simply by Ukrainian-only action (210 billion euros frozen, up to 165 billion euros loan for Ukraine noted) [4].
4. Diplomacy: negotiations, guarantees and the limits of battlefield-only solutions
High-level diplomacy is active and decisive. US- and European-backed peace plans, multinational talks in Berlin and Miami, and American pressure shape the strategic environment; Ukraine insists on security guarantees and reparations while Russia demands territorial concessions—positions that make a purely military “win” insufficient for a lasting solution, according to reporting on talks and opposing stances (diplomatic activity; competing demands; Zelensky’s insistence on guarantees) [6] [5] [7]. Western negotiators and proposals matter because an imposed military victory without recognized security arrangements risks future conflict.
5. Information, cognitive warfare and political will: the propaganda front
Russian cognitive warfare seeks to depict imminent victory and to force diplomatic concessions despite battlefield limits; ISW and analysts flag Kremlin messaging intended to convince others that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West, even as Russian gains remain limited and costly (Kremlin cognitive warfare aims vs actual limited gains) [2] [10]. Political pressure from other actors—most visibly the U.S. administration and European capitals—shapes whether Ukraine must accept negotiated terms or continue fighting, which means “winning” is as much political as military [6] [11].
6. Competing perspectives and the factual limits of the sources
One perspective—emphasized by some Western analysts—is that Ukraine’s drone-enabled defenses and NATO-linked aid can sustain a counteroffensive and impose prohibitive costs on Russia over time [2]. Another, reflected in diplomatic reporting, warns that Ukraine faces intense pressure to accept peace plans and that Russia’s economy and mobilization capacity enable prolonged attrition, so victory without partners would be extraordinarily costly [6] [9]. Available sources do not mention a definitive, source-backed roadmap showing Ukraine winning entirely “by itself” without continued foreign assistance or diplomatic outcomes; no source claims unilateral Ukrainian victory is currently feasible without external support (not found in current reporting).
Conclusion: The reporting shows Ukraine can and does achieve tactical successes, but the military, economic and diplomatic dynamics documented in these sources indicate that a durable strategic victory achieved “by itself” is not supported by current open-source assessments; sustained Western financial, military and political backing and successful negotiations are decisive variables (territorial holdings near 20%, recent gains/losses, frozen assets and diplomatic initiatives cited) [1] [2] [4] [5].