How have Caribbean interdiction efforts changed since 2023 and what is their recorded impact on cocaine seizures?

1. What changed operationally after 2023: more US support, new partnerships and a focus on ports and air nodes

Governments and U.S. agencies deepened counter‑drug cooperation after mid‑2023, rolling out joint task forces and initiatives that emphasized airport/container‑port screening and intelligence sharing; the U.S. State Department explicitly referenced an international partnership launched in mid‑2023 and continued emphasis on port security in its 2025 reporting ^[4], while reporting by InSight Crime and other outlets documents DEA and U.S. participation in operations that pressured traditional transit points ^{[1] [3]}.

2. How traffickers responded: route displacement and larger consignments to new Caribbean nodes

Analysts report trafficking groups reacted to pressure in long‑standing hubs like the Dominican Republic by shifting routes and consolidating loads through alternative Caribbean points, a dynamic visible in spikes of very large seizures in islands — Jamaica’s major container and airport hauls in late 2023 and 2024 are offered as examples of that displacement and concentration effect ^{[1] [3] [5]}.

3. Measured seizure outcomes: big headline hauls but uneven, incomplete data

Several jurisdictions recorded exceptionally large individual seizures — including multi‑ton container hauls in Jamaica and previous large totals out of the Dominican Republic — and UNODC seizure maps catalogue significant individual Caribbean seizures in 2023–24, yet national reporting is uneven (Jamaica data were not fully available to InSight Crime) and global production jumped, complicating interpretation of interdiction impact ^{[3] [6] [1] [2]}.

4. The counterfactual: why more seizures do not necessarily mean less cocaine on the market

UNODC estimated cocaine production rose sharply in 2023 (about 34% higher), meaning larger seizures can coexist with larger flows; seizures may reflect either operational success in intercepting bigger consignments or traffickers’ adaptive behavior concentrating product into fewer shipments — both produce headline totals without proving a decline in net outbound volumes ^{[2] [1]}.

5. Regional nuance: which countries saw increases and where interdiction appears to have shifted pressure

The Dominican Republic remains a key seizure point historically, but reporting shows Panama and Costa Rica saw decreases in seizures even as Caribbean territories recorded some big hauls, consistent with a west‑to‑east displacement and growing transatlantic flows destined for Europe that exploit Caribbean nodes ^{[1] [5] [3]}.

6. Data and attribution limits: transparency gaps and competing narratives

Available public data are fragmented — national disclosure varies, open Jamaican statistics were limited in InSight Crime’s requests, and U.S. dashboards caution that seizure figures change with reporting and definitions — so any claim that interdiction “reduced” cocaine flows through the Caribbean is constrained by incomplete reporting and rising production upstream ^{[1] [7] [2]}.

7. Alternative interpretations and policy implications

Policymakers and advocates diverge: some cite larger seizures as proof interdiction is working and should be scaled; others, noting increased production and route displacement toward Europe and new Caribbean nodes, argue interdiction without upstream or demand‑side measures simply reshuffles trafficking and incentivizes larger, riskier shipments ^{[2] [5] [8]}.

Conclusion: qualified impact — tactical wins, strategic uncertainty

Since 2023 Caribbean interdiction has produced notable tactical successes — several multi‑ton seizures and intensified U.S.‑partnered operations — and appears to have shifted trafficking patterns, but the net effect on cocaine availability is ambiguous because 2023 production rose substantially and regional reporting gaps prevent precise measurement of how much traffic was diverted, reduced, or redistributed ^{[3] [1] [2]}.