What chance of European/Russian war?
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Executive summary
The immediate risk of a direct all‑out war between Russia and the collective of European states remains limited but non‑negligible: most expert forecasting and intelligence products see a higher probability of a prolonged or regionalised conflict spreading risks than of a sudden full‑scale Europe‑wide invasion in the next 12 months, while several agencies warn the risk rises substantially over a multi‑year horizon if NATO cohesion weakens [1] [2] [3]. Domestic politics, US policy shifts and a prolonged Ukraine war are the key accelerants that could turn a contained conflict into a broader European war [4] [1].
1. Short term (next 12 months): low‑to‑medium probability, driven by miscalculation and escalation
Most Western analysts currently place greater weight on a prolonged war of attrition in Ukraine and localized provocations rather than an immediate Russian campaign against NATO states, making a sudden pan‑European war in the next year unlikely though possible through miscalculation, cross‑border strikes or targeted sabotage; scenario work from GLOBSEC highlighted a “Prolonged War of Attrition” as the leading outlook beyond 2025 (probability score ~31%) rather than a sudden Europe‑wide offensive [1]. Russia’s public threats that it is “ready” if Europe starts a war underscore the danger of rhetoric inflaming crisis dynamics, but Putin’s statements do not by themselves equal intent for immediate large‑scale invasion [5] [6].
2. Medium term (1–5 years): rising probability if NATO appears weak or divided
Intelligence warnings and think‑tank analysis converge on a higher risk over a multi‑year horizon, with Denmark’s DDIS explicitly warning that if Moscow perceives NATO as weakened it could be willing to wage “a large‑scale war” in Europe within five years, and mapping scenarios in which a frozen conflict enables Russian advantage in the short term and opportunity for regional aggression later [2] [1]. The Centre for European Reform and other analysts argue that US policy swings and European political divisions materially raise this risk by undermining deterrence, a reality reflected in recent summit politics and competing peace proposals [4].
3. Military balance and preparedness: not decisive, but shifting
Europe’s militaries have been rearming — with conscription revived in parts of Scandinavia and the Baltics and pledges to raise defence spending — yet capability gaps remain, particularly in sustained manpower and logistics; this means Europe is strengthening deterrence but still vulnerable to short, intense campaigns and hybrid attacks [7] [3]. Analysts note that Europe retains advantages in air, naval, space and cyber domains even as Russia pursues an “expanded conception of warfare” designed to paralyse decision‑making through cross‑domain coercion [3].
4. Political and informational warfare: an underestimated accelerant
Moscow’s information campaigns and diplomatic posture aim to portray Europe as an existential enemy and to foment political fissures inside the EU and NATO; US and European officials say such campaigns are part of a strategy to militarise Russian society and weaken Western resolve, a factor that could lower the threshold for kinetic action if political cohesion frays [8] [4]. Domestic public sentiment mirrors this anxiety: polls show roughly half of Europeans perceive a high risk of war with Russia and most doubt their country’s readiness, a political environment that can both push governments to bolster defence and raise the risk of missteps [9].
5. Putin’s rhetoric and Russian capacity: deterrent talk vs operational reality
Russian leaders repeatedly issue stark warnings that Russia would defeat Europe if a war were launched, language intended to deter and to shape domestic narratives; independent assessments, however, point to Russia’s heavy war costs, economic strain and limits in sustaining multi‑front high‑intensity campaigns — factors that complicate both its ability and likely appetite for a general European invasion in the immediate term [6] [10] [3].
6. Bottom line assessment and probability framing
Weighing expert scenarios, intelligence warnings and public signals yields a practical estimate: low‑to‑medium probability of a direct Europe‑wide war in the next 12 months, rising to medium‑to‑high within a 3–5 year window if the Ukraine conflict freezes, NATO cohesion erodes, and Russian coercion persists — with significant caveats about uncertainty and nonlinear escalation dynamics [1] [2] [4]. Policy choices matter: stronger European defence integration, clear US commitments or a credible negotiated settlement that addresses core security concerns would materially lower those odds, whereas political fragmentation, premature withdrawal of support for Ukraine, or major provocations could raise them [4] [1].