SBU presented captured Chinese citizens (Zhang Renbo, Wang Guangjun) who fought for Russia, claiming they were recruited under false pretenses and never paid
Executive summary
Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) has publicized two captured Chinese nationals, identified as Wang Guangjun (born 1991) and Zhang Renbo (born 1998), who say they were recruited to serve with Russian forces after seeing recruitment material and social-media posts and that they were promised pay or noncombat roles but ended up at the front with little control over wages or documents [1] [2] [3]. Multiple Ukrainian and international outlets report the men describing confiscated bank cards, unclear contracts, and promises of pay (2 million rubles or other sums cited) or citizenship that did not materialize [4] [5] [2].
1. What the SBU presented: names, timelines and main claims
Ukrainian authorities released video testimony, documents and a press conference naming Wang and Zhang, saying Wang arrived in Moscow in February 2025, received days of training, was moved to Rostov and then deployed to Donetsk where he was captured on April 4; Zhang reportedly arrived in Russia in December 2024 and was sent to the front after applying for a contract [3] [6] [5]. The captives told Ukrainian interrogators they were recruited via intermediaries and social-media ads, promised pay or a noncombat role, had documents and cards in Russian they could not use, and said recruiters misled them about duties and compensation [4] [2] [7].
2. What the prisoners say about payment and deception
Both men described being recruited under false pretences. Wang said he expected a medical role and salary but was quickly sent to a combat unit; Zhang said he received a card with 200,000 rubles that he could not access and that Russians took the card to buy fuel and power banks [2] [4]. Reporting cites different monetary figures in the recruitment promises — from 2 million rubles promised to Zhang in one document to 300,000 rubles paid to middlemen in another account — underscoring inconsistent claims and the SBU’s narrative that recruiters exploited recruits’ expectations [3] [8] [9].
3. Corroboration across outlets and remaining gaps
Multiple outlets — Kyiv Independent, Business Insider, The Diplomat, Kyiv Post and others — repeat core elements of the SBU presentation: social-media adverts, middlemen, rapid deployment from Moscow training to frontlines, and confiscation of phones/cards [3] [2] [8] [7]. These reports rely primarily on SBU-released videos and statements; available sources do not include independent verification from Russian military officials, the recruiters, or formal contract paperwork authenticated by neutral third parties, and do not cite direct payment records from Russian payrolls [2] [7].
4. Broader pattern SBU and Kyiv describe — numbers and recruitment channels
Ukrainian officials say these two are part of a larger phenomenon: President Zelensky and SBU materials cite roughly 155–163 Chinese nationals fighting for Russia, and Ukrainian reporting links recruitment to Chinese social media (Douyin/TikTok), livestreams and intermediaries operating in China and abroad [1] [10] [11]. Journalists who traced the story note frequent Russian recruiting ads on Chinese platforms and livestreaming by other foreign fighters, giving the SBU’s claims a broader context even if each individual recruitment chain is not fully independently audited [10].
5. Competing perspectives and potential agendas
The SBU has a clear incentive to publicize foreign fighters to pressure both Russia and countries of origin; Ukrainian outlets derive most of their material from SBU video and documents, creating the risk that Ukrainian security priorities shape how testimonies are presented [7]. Chinese government spokespeople officially urged nationals to avoid conflict zones, and reporting shows Chinese authorities warned some would-be recruits not to go to Russia, indicating Beijing’s official stance differs from how recruiters and social-media influencers framed opportunities [2] [10]. Russian state sources or recruiters are absent from the materials provided here; available sources do not mention a Russian-side rebuttal or independent Russian payroll confirmation [2] [10].
6. What is reliably known and what is not
Reliable: the SBU released two named Chinese captives who, on camera and in press events, say they were recruited via social media/ middlemen, promised pay or noncombat roles, and ended up at the front with restricted access to cards/phones [4] [2] [7]. Not found in current reporting: authenticated contract copies independently verified by neutral parties, payment ledgers from Russian military payrolls proving promised sums were withheld, or public statements from the recruiters named in the SBU material that accept or deny the accusations [2] [7].
7. What to watch next
Verify whether third-party journalists or international investigators can access the original contracts, bank records, independent witnesses (transport, interpreters, recruiters), or Russian-side responses to substantiate or contest the SBU’s account. Also watch for Beijing’s consular handling and any formal exchanges or diplomatic notes, which would test competing narratives about coercion versus voluntary enlistment flagged in the SBU materials [10] [1].
Limitations: this analysis uses only SBU-sourced testimony and reporting that reproduces it; independent confirmation of payment flows or recruiter identities is not present in the available sources [2] [7].