Detailed introduction to the secret stories of the Chinese Space Force, Rocket Force, and their senior management, as well as the storage and testing of nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines·
Executive summary
China’s Rocket Force—formerly the Second Artillery Corps—is now a full-service branch charged with land-based nuclear and conventional missiles and has been central to Beijing’s rapid nuclear modernization [1] [2]; parallel reorganizations created an Aerospace Force responsible for space launches and testing sites such as Jiuqian and Lop Nur [3] [4]. Open-source reporting highlights accelerated silo construction, new ICBMs and sea-based upgrades while also documenting limited transparency from Beijing and periodic leadership reshuffles that may signal political control as much as technical change [5] [6] [7].
1. The Rocket Force’s official remit and capabilities
The PLARF was elevated from the Second Artillery to a separate service with responsibility for China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces, now organized into numbered bases that control long- and medium-range systems, including bases thought to house longer-range nuclear forces such as Bases 64 and 66 [2] [8]; U.S. and academic estimates show Beijing is fielding newer, more mobile solid-fueled ICBMs and silo fields that expand deterrent options [9] [5].
2. China’s Aerospace (Space) Force and launch infrastructure
China’s aerospace launch and testing infrastructure is concentrated at sites long associated with both space and missile programs—Jiuqian for Long March rockets, Lop Nur and Malan for missile testing and earlier nuclear test activity—with facilities described as dispersed and concealed to increase survivability [3]; the Aerospace Force institutionalizes national ambitions in space while inheriting launch ranges that double as missile testbeds [4] [3].
3. Senior management, political control, and leadership changes
High-profile personnel moves have accompanied the buildup: Beijing replaced senior Rocket Force generals in 2023 in a break with internal promotion practice, a change read by some analysts as a sign of tighter political control from Xi Jinping rather than a shift in technical trajectory [7]; U.S. reporting and Pentagon assessments attribute the force’s direction both to institutional modernization and to strategic priorities set by the Central Military Commission [1] [9].
4. Where and how nuclear warheads and submarines fit into the picture
Open-source analysts document an expanding Chinese stockpile estimated in recent years between roughly 500 and 600 warheads (with some sources tracking higher DoD projections toward 1,000 by 2030), and note a growing triad that includes land ICBMs, upgraded Jin-class SSBNs at Yalong/Longposan and refits to carry longer-range JL-3 SLBMs, and nascent bomber roles—moves that complicate previous assessments of China’s relatively small arsenal [1] [6] [10] [5]. Reporting identifies specific logistics nodes—such as Base 67 (formerly Base 22)—as responsible for warhead maintenance, and describes submarine patrol basing at Hainan-linked facilities where Jin-class SSBNs operate [11] [6].
5. Testing, storage practices, and transparency limits
Public records and Western reports document missile tests including at-sea ICBM launches and expanded silo deployment, but authoritative details on warhead storage conditions, readiness postures, and numbers in operational environments remain limited by Beijing’s opacity and competing analytic methods; U.S. DoD releases and think-tank estimates provide the clearest available windows but diverge on exact stockpile counts and alert practices [12] [9] [5]. Analysts and Chinese officials offer contrasting narratives—foreign experts warn of rapid expansion and shifts in alert posture while Beijing insists its strategy is defensive and minimum necessary—revealing an implicit political agenda behind selective disclosure [13] [12].
6. Strategic consequences and competing interpretations
The combination of more mobile missiles, silo fields, and a sea-based leg increases China’s strategic complexity for rivals and raises questions about crisis stability and arms-race dynamics; U.S. and Western analysts emphasize the speed and scale of modernization as a challenge to deterrence, whereas Chinese official statements emphasize restraint and a defensive posture—both positions reflect institutional and political incentives shaping public messaging [9] [13] [5]. Available reporting is robust on capabilities trends but constrained on many operational specifics; where evidence is thin, reporting appropriately hedges with estimates rather than firm claims [10] [1].