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Which countries currently operate the Saab JAS 39 Gripen instead of procuring the F-35, and when were those decisions made?
Executive summary
Several countries operate the Saab JAS 39 Gripen as their chosen frontline fighter rather than the Lockheed Martin F‑35; those operators widely reported in the supplied sources are Sweden, Brazil, South Africa, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Thailand and Colombia — with Colombia moving from intent to a signed purchase in 2025 (contract announced Nov 14/15, 2025) [1] [2] [3]. Coverage also notes active leases and extensions (Czech Republic) and ongoing procurement interest or negotiations in other states (Canada, Ukraine) where Gripen has been offered as an alternative to F‑35 buys [4] [5] [6] [7].
1. Who currently flies the Gripen — a concise roll call
The aircraft is in service with Sweden (its developer), Brazil (large E‑series order and local assembly), South Africa, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Thailand, and Colombia has recently formalized a multi‑year purchase — all reported operators or confirmed buyers in the supplied reporting [8] [3] [1] [2]. Different sources list the same roster: Saab’s marketing material and reporting list Sweden, Brazil, South Africa, Czech Republic and Hungary, while defense reporting adds Thailand and Colombia as current/confirmed operators or buyers [8] [3] [1].
2. When did those countries decide not to buy the F‑35?
Available sources do not provide a neat, single date for each operator declining the F‑35; they instead document national acquisition choices or contracts for the Gripen and, in some cases, parallel F‑35 decisions. For example, Colombia publicly selected Gripen E/F in April 2025 and signed the contract in November 2025 — an explicit choice away from other contenders including U.S. options [2] [1]. For others (Sweden, Brazil, South Africa, Hungary, Czech Republic, Thailand), reporting identifies them as Gripen operators or buyers but does not frame each as an explicit formal "decision against the F‑35" in the provided materials [8] [3] [9].
3. Notable procurement timelines and milestones
Colombia: announcement of selection in April 2025 and a Saab contract reported/signed mid‑November 2025 for 17 aircraft (15 E + 2 F) with Reuters covering the November contract value and timing [2] [1]. Brazil: long‑standing Gripen E procurement with domestic assembly and an expanding order (36 reported, with later increases noted in 2024–25 reporting) — Brazil’s program is a multi‑year industrial partnership rather than a single procurement moment, and sources cite Brazil as a major Gripen customer [1] [2]. Czech Republic: lease extensions and continued operation are reported (lease extended until 2031 in some coverage), indicating a decision to keep Gripens temporarily instead of immediate replacement with F‑35s; the Czech path shows transition planning rather than a direct F‑35 rejection in the supplied text [4].
4. Where Gripen has been explicitly pitched as an F‑35 alternative
Saab has actively marketed Gripen as a lower‑cost, fourth‑generation alternative to the F‑35; reporting notes the aircraft was offered and remained part of competitive bids (Canada, Finland, Philippines) and that Saab highlighted opportunities when some nations "waver" on F‑35 commitments [5]. In Canada’s case, reporting shows that the F‑35 contract outcome (selection of F‑35s) closed the Gripen’s formal chance in 2023, though later political debate and Saab’s continued offers kept the Gripen in conversations [5].
5. Competing narratives and hidden agendas in the sources
Saab and Swedish reporting emphasize Gripen’s lower operating costs and industrial partnerships (local assembly in Brazil, potential licensed builds) as a selling point to nations weighing F‑35 costs and sovereignty implications [10] [6] [7]. Defense reporting frames some buys as strategic choices tied to regional politics or industrial offsets (Brazil’s local production; Colombia’s offsets), which serves both national industrial ambitions and Saab’s export aims [1] [11]. Conversely, when a country selects the F‑35 (e.g., Canada’s 2023 procurement), those sources show procurement outcomes can be driven by alliance interoperability, strategic alignment with U.S. suppliers, or political decisions that outweigh cost/industrial arguments [5].
6. Limitations and what the current sources do not say
The supplied reporting does not provide a comprehensive, per‑country timeline explicitly labeling each Gripen operator’s decision as a direct rejection of the F‑35; several countries became Gripen operators through domestic programs or earlier selections long before the F‑35 procurement era, and those choices are not framed here as explicit "instead of F‑35" rejections [8] [9]. Detailed, dated procurement debates for every operator (e.g., precise parliament votes or tender dates for Hungary, South Africa, Thailand) are not included in the provided sources — available sources do not mention those specific decision‑dates beyond the examples cited above [3] [1].
If you want, I can: (A) extract a country‑by‑country timeline only where the provided sources give explicit dates (e.g., Colombia and Czech lease extensions), or (B) expand into sourced background on why governments weigh Gripen vs F‑35 (cost, industrial offsets, interoperability) using the same references. Which would you prefer?