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Which nations have purchased Saab Gripen instead of the F-35 and what were their official reasons?
Executive summary
Several countries have chosen Saab’s Gripen over the Lockheed Martin F‑35 in past competitions or purchases, most notably Brazil, Thailand, and Colombia (historically or recently) — with official rationales emphasizing lower acquisition and operating costs, industrial offsets or local production, and suitability to national needs rather than “fifth‑generation” stealth requirements [1] [2]. Canada is actively reconsidering its F‑35 plan and Saab is pitching Gripen on jobs and domestic assembly; Ottawa’s stated reasons include stronger industrial benefits and concerns about the jobs delivered so far under the F‑35 deal [3] [4].
1. Brazil — industrial partnerships and tailored capability
Brazil expanded its Gripen E order and framed the purchase as not only acquiring aircraft but also building domestic aerospace capabilities: a 2014 deal for 36 Gripen Es grew via letters and negotiations into talks to increase quantities and deepen cooperation with Embraer and Sweden on related platforms, signalling that industrial offsets and technology transfer were primary selling points for Brasília [1].
2. Thailand — a cost‑conscious replacement for aging fighters
Thailand’s recent acquisition of four Gripen E/F to replace older F‑16s was presented in reporting as a pragmatic, budget‑sensitive move: the Gripen’s lower operating costs and suitability for the kingdom’s defence profile were emphasised in coverage of the sale [1] [5]. Sources note Saab’s positioning of the Gripen as more affordable and available than competitors [6].
3. Colombia — replacing Kfirs with Gripen E/F and fleet fit
Colombia selected the Gripen E/F to replace IAI Kfir fighters; reports describe a deal expected to include 16–24 units, and later confirmations for deliveries — indicating Bogotá’s choice was driven by a fit to mission requirements and the offer package rather than a stealth‑centric doctrine [1].
4. Ukraine interest and larger export narrative
Reporting shows Ukraine ordered significant numbers of Gripen in 2024–25 reporting threads and that Saab has pitched local manufacturing options for countries like Canada by referencing production tied to Ukraine orders — this underscores Saab’s sales argument that Gripen can be produced regionally and scaled for partners’ industrial benefit [1] [7].
5. Canada’s debate — jobs, offsets and sovereignty versus fifth‑generation capability
Canada’s government has publicly signalled interest in Gripen amid backlash over the F‑35 contract’s perceived limited economic returns; Industry Minister Mélanie Joly said Saab has promised thousands of Canadian jobs and proposed to manufacture aircraft and the GlobalEye AEW&C in Canada, and Ottawa has criticised the industrial benefits received so far under the F‑35 deal [3] [4]. Defence officials and some military voices, however, continue to defend the F‑35’s capabilities, and former senior officers and commentators are campaigning to keep the F‑35 purchase — highlighting a clear split between industrial/economic and capability/security arguments [8].
6. Why authorities cite Gripen over F‑35 — themes across cases
Across reported cases, official and vendor rationales for choosing Gripen emphasise: lower life‑cycle costs and higher availability rates; stronger, verifiable industrial offsets and domestic jobs; and a platform better matched to certain countries’ defence needs [6] [3] [2]. Conversely, critics and some defence experts stress that the Gripen is not a fifth‑generation stealth fighter and that reliance on U.S. supply chains and comparative capability tradeoffs have repeatedly been raised against Saab’s claims [9] [5].
7. Competing perspectives and political subtext
Coverage makes clear competing agendas: Saab’s sales pitch foregrounds jobs and affordability to sway politically sensitive procurement debates [3] [4], while defenders of the F‑35 stress strategic interoperability, stealth capability and previous competition results where the F‑35 won [8] [5]. Some criticism frames Saab’s operating‑cost claims as originating from company‑commissioned studies and challenges their veracity [9]. These disagreements reflect hidden incentives: national governments balancing industrial policy and alliance politics, Saab seeking market share, and Lockheed Martin defending a multibillion‑dollar program [3] [9].
8. Limitations in current reporting
Available sources list specific purchases, offers, and political debates but do not provide exhaustive, single‑source lists of “every nation that chose Gripen instead of F‑35” and do not uniformly present official procurement rationale documents for each country; some claims (for example precise operating‑cost figures or the full content of offset agreements) are disputed in the press and rely on vendor or critic analyses [9] [6]. Where sources explicitly refute a claim, I have cited them [9].
If you want, I can compile a table of confirmed Gripen purchasers mentioned in these sources alongside the exact official reasons quoted in government statements and Saab press material (using only the cited reporting above).