Has the Department of Defense addressed food insecurity issues?

1. DoD has formally recognized the problem and created a strategy

DoD produced a formal “Strengthening Food Security in the Force” strategy and roadmap and committed senior-level oversight — with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness reporting progress to the Deputy Secretary and workstreams across services — signaling enterprise-level attention rather than purely local fixes ^{[5] [6]}. RAND was asked by DoD to provide analytic support and its work informed the Department’s responses to Congressional questions about the extent and causes of food insecurity among service members and dependents ^{[3] [7]}.

2. The scale the DoD cites is striking: roughly one-in-four service members affected

DoD analyses and reporting cited in news coverage place the prevalence around 24% of active-duty members experiencing some level of food insecurity in 2019–2020, a figure that prompted DoD to shift measurement away from SNAP enrollment and toward survey-based screening like the USDA six‑item module adopted in the Status of Forces Survey (SOFS-A) ^{[1] [3] [7]}.

3. Concrete actions: pay, toolkits, pantry programs, and awareness campaigns

Actions taken or announced include temporary Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) adjustments in some high-cost areas, a 90-day roadmap ordered by Secretary Lloyd Austin in late 2021, release of a “Military Leaders Economic Security Toolkit,” unit-level food pantries, and planned “Resources at the Ready” outreach to raise awareness of benefits and assistance ^{[8] [6] [1]}.

4. Data and evaluation remain key gaps highlighted by independent reviewers

RAND’s and GAO’s work emphasize DoD collection of better data — including SOFS-A questions and new qualitative collection efforts — but both point to remaining weaknesses: low use of food assistance by food‑insecure members, cultural barriers to seeking help, and insufficient performance goals or metrics to evaluate nutrition and food-security initiatives across the department ^{[3] [7] [4]}. GAO specifically recommended DoD establish strategic goals, performance measures, and clearer leadership responsibilities to evaluate progress ^{[4] [2]}.

5. Non‑DoD groups are pushing policy changes and supporting service members

Advocacy and service organizations such as Feeding America, Military Family Advisory Network (MFAN), and others are urging Congress to remove policy barriers (for example, changes to the Basic Needs Allowance calculation) and are providing direct support — meal distribution, pantries, and research — to complement DoD efforts ^{[9] [10] [11] [12]}. These groups highlight that while the DoD can act internally, broader federal policy and community partnerships are necessary to reach families effectively ^{[9] [11]}.

6. Diverging perspectives: DoD progress versus calls for more urgency

DoD and its allies point to the strategy, toolkits, temporary housing‑allowance fixes, and grassroots pantry programs as meaningful progress ^{[6] [8] [1]}. Critics and auditors say the department still lacks clear performance metrics and comprehensive oversight to ensure programs produce lasting reductions in food insecurity, and that stigma and underuse of assistance are persistent problems that policy changes and outreach must tackle ^{[4] [3] [7]}.

7. What the reporting does not resolve

Available sources do not mention long-term outcome data showing sustained declines in food insecurity after DoD’s initiatives (not found in current reporting). Similarly, concrete cost estimates for scaling DoD’s roadmap across all installations are not provided in the cited materials (not found in current reporting), nor are comprehensive timelines showing when DoD will meet specific performance targets beyond periodic progress reports ^{[5] [4]}.

8. Bottom line for readers

DoD has moved from acknowledgement to a structured, multi-pronged response — strategy documents, data collection changes, targeted pay adjustments, leadership toolkits, and local pantry/outreach efforts — but independent analyses from RAND and GAO make clear that further work is required: better tracking, measurable goals, and actions to overcome stigma and low take‑up of assistance if the department is to reduce the roughly 24% figure reported for recent years ^{[1] [3] [4]}.