How did the 2020 Doha agreement and US withdrawal policies impact Taliban finances?
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Executive summary
The February 29, 2020 Doha Agreement committed the U.S. to a phased withdrawal of all U.S. and coalition forces within 14 months and promised sanctions relief contingent on Taliban commitments, while the U.S. reduced troop levels early in 2020 [1] [2]. After the August 2021 withdrawal, U.S. and international aid flows — more than $3 billion in humanitarian and development assistance from October 2021–December 2024 and larger pre-existing grant flows — became the primary lever shaping Taliban access to money: watchdogs reported at least $10–10.9 million reached the Taliban in taxes or diversion, and U.S. officials have warned they cannot fully assure that aid did not indirectly benefit the group [3] [4] [5] [6].
1. Doha’s bargain: withdrawal for guarantees, not cash
The Doha Agreement explicitly traded a U.S. timeline for troop withdrawal and base closures for Taliban commitments — most notably to prevent Afghan soil from being used by international terrorist groups — and it signalled intentions to remove Taliban sanctions if conditions were met [1] [2]. The accord left economic questions largely to future intra‑Afghan talks and did not create a direct, dedicated revenue stream to the Taliban; its central financial effect was to change the security calculus that determines who controls state assets and patronage networks inside Afghanistan [1] [2].
2. Withdrawal mechanics changed the fiscal map
By committing to a phased pullout and reducing troop numbers (from roughly 12–13,000 down toward 8,600 in mid‑2020), the U.S. altered on‑the‑ground power balances that later allowed the Taliban to seize state institutions and assets after Kabul fell in August 2021 [7] [8]. Control of the state — including the central bank, tax collection points and customs — transformed the Taliban from an insurgent actor into a de facto state manager with new access to revenues that previously flowed to the republic [9].
3. Aid shifted from government budget support to humanitarian channels
Before the collapse, foreign aid accounted for a very high share of Afghan public spending. After the takeover Western donors moved to provide humanitarian and development assistance while avoiding formal recognition or budgetary transfers to the Taliban government; between October 2021 and December 2024 the U.S. alone allocated just over $3 billion in humanitarian and development assistance, remaining the largest donor [3] [4]. Those donor choices aimed to meet humanitarian need while denying direct budgetary support to the Taliban [4].
4. Indirect access: taxes, fees and the “shadow” capture of aid
Multiple oversight reports and congressional testimony document that Taliban authorities have captured some revenue from aid operations and state assets. SIGAR and other reports estimated at least $10–10.9 million in taxes and fees paid to Taliban authorities since August 2021, and U.S. watchdog testimony conceded an inability to categorically assure that U.S. aid was not, in some instances, benefiting the Taliban indirectly [4] [6] [5]. Lawmakers and advocates point to customs, local taxes, NGO payments and currency conversion processes as channels where the regime takes a cut [4] [10].
5. Frozen reserves and the Afghan Fund: leverage that never fully translated
The U.S. froze roughly $7 billion in Afghan central bank assets after the Taliban takeover and proposed allocating $3.5 billion via a Switzerland‑based Afghan Fund for targeted disbursements, but that fund had not made disbursements as of January 2025 — limiting any rapid infusion of those reserves into Afghanistan’s economy and into Taliban coffers [3]. The asset freeze remained a potent form of leverage even if litigation and political constraints constrained its operational use [3].
6. Competing narratives: did U.S. policy “fund” the Taliban?
Critics in Congress and media argue that U.S. aid and the mechanics of the withdrawal indirectly funded the Taliban — citing SIGAR figures, reports of taxes paid to Taliban authorities and examples of equipment and funds falling under Taliban control [4] [10] [5]. U.S. agencies and many donors counter that assistance is routed through NGOs and international organizations with safeguards and that the intent and structure aim to avoid direct funding of the Taliban [11] [4]. Both positions rely on the same oversight findings but diverge on whether those leaks reflect policy failure or unavoidable operational risk [4] [5] [11].
7. What the evidence does — and does not — show
Available reporting documents concrete instances and estimates: $10–10.9 million in taxes/fees to Taliban authorities and watchdogs’ inability to categorically rule out indirect benefit from some U.S. aid, plus the Taliban’s larger fiscal gains from seizing state assets and customs after the U.S. withdrawal [4] [6] [10]. Available sources do not mention precise totals for all Taliban revenues post‑takeover (for example aggregate customs receipts or exact sums from currency operations) and do not support sweeping claims that all or most U.S. aid directly paid Taliban salaries (not found in current reporting).
8. Bottom line for policymakers and journalists
The Doha Agreement removed a major external counterweight to Taliban ambitions by committing to U.S. withdrawal and thereby reshaped which actors control Afghanistan’s formal fiscal levers [1] [7]. Since August 2021, donors’ attempts to deliver humanitarian relief while denying direct budget support to the Taliban have reduced but not eliminated the regime’s ability to profit from aid and state revenues; oversight reports quantify some leakage but leave unresolved the full scale and long‑term fiscal consequences [4] [6]. Reporters and policymakers must therefore treat claims about “U.S. funding the Taliban” as partially supported by watchdog findings on indirect diversion, while recognizing the limits of existing public accounting [4] [5].