Which European countries are actively increasing F‑35 purchases versus those pursuing European fighter programs?
Executive summary
Europe is split between an expanding club of F‑35 buyers — including several Nordic states, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, the UK, Poland, Germany and Belgium — that are increasing purchases to field fifth‑generation capability and NATO interoperability [1] [2] [3] [4]. Conversely, a smaller but politically significant group led by France and Spain is doubling down on European programmes (Eurofighter upgrades, FCAS) or signaling hesitancy toward U.S. platforms, citing strategic autonomy and industrial policy [5] [6].
1. The consolidation: who is visibly increasing F‑35 buys and why
Several European countries are actively expanding F‑35 fleets: Norway and the Netherlands are essentially transitioned onto the type, Denmark has a multi‑year delivery plan and increasing its stock, Finland ordered 64 jets with deliveries starting mid‑2026, and Poland, Germany and Belgium have firm orders or expansions underway to replace legacy fleets and meet NATO roles [2] [7] [3] [4] [1]. The drivers cited across reporting are operational — fifth‑generation stealth, ISR and NATO interoperability — and political: replacing Soviet or older Western jets quickly amid heightened security concerns [8] [9] [1].
2. Major powers buying but balancing with domestic platforms
The UK and Italy operate and continue to buy F‑35 variants (the RAF/RN F‑35B and Italian involvement in production), yet both keep Eurofighter Typhoon or other European systems central to broader force structure and carrier/air defence roles [2] [10]. Germany’s decision to buy 35 F‑35As for the nuclear role illustrates an operational need overriding industrial preference, even as Berlin participates in European projects and domestic procurement discussions [2] [10].
3. The European programme camp: industrial autonomy and future tech bets
France has long pushed an indigenous path and co‑leads the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) with Germany and Spain; Spain publicly emphasized expanding Eurofighter capacity and backing FCAS over an F‑35 buy in reporting on shifting budget priorities [5]. AP reporting shows a wider political debate across Europe and Canada about the risks of deep dependence on American platforms — particularly after political uncertainties in Washington — which fuels interest in European alternatives [6].
4. Middle ground and hedging: countries buying some F‑35s while investing in Europe
Several governments are hedging: they procure F‑35 squadrons to meet near‑term needs and NATO commitments while investing in European industrial participation or future programmes to preserve sovereign capabilities and jobs, a dynamic captured in reporting about Europeanisation of the F‑35 supply chain and national industrial roles [10] [1]. That dual approach explains why nations like Italy and the UK both expand F‑35 inventories and remain core partners in European projects [10] [2].
5. Geopolitics, interoperability and the risk of reliance
Proponents argue the spread of the F‑35 reshapes Europe’s deterrent posture positively by standardising advanced capability across NATO front‑line states (manufacturer commentary and analyses) [8] [1]. Critics and some policymakers warn of strategic over‑reliance on a single U.S. platform — a concern amplified by reporting that political shifts in the U.S. could jeopardize alliance cohesion and sales — which feeds the push for European alternatives [6] [1].
6. Gaps in the record and what remains unclear
The available reporting documents orders, deliveries, and stated national programmes but does not provide a fully standardized, country‑by‑country accounting of planned increases versus purely symbolic purchases; likewise, long‑term procurement choices may shift with budgets and politics, and reporting does not uniformly cover those contingency plans [2] [4] [5]. Where sources differ — for example on Spain’s public pivot to Eurofighter/FCAS versus any covert procurement talks — the reporting signals competing agendas: industrial protectionism and strategic autonomy on one side, operational urgency and interoperability on the other [5] [6].