Which European countries have bought or donated U.S.-origin weapons to Ukraine, and how were those acquisitions funded?

1. Who bought U.S. weapons for Ukraine — the headline players

Poland stands out as the single largest European buyer of U.S. equipment in recent years, accounting for over $55 billion in FMS notifications from 2022–2024, a figure that Bruegel highlights as driving much of Europe’s demand for U.S. systems ^[1]; Dutch and UK contributions are visible in specific systems deliveries (the Netherlands with F‑16s deliveries and the UK committing large air‑defence procurement for Ukraine), and leaders such as Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte publicly framed a Europe/Canada drive to purchase roughly €4.3 billion of U.S. weapons to keep supplies flowing to Kyiv after Washington slowed direct deliveries ^{[4] [2]}.

2. Who donated U.S.-origin weapons (and how that differs from buying new kits)

Many European countries donated weapons drawn from national stocks or repurposed acquisitions — a pattern catalogued by arms‑transfer trackers that list donations from more than 30 countries plus the EU — and some of those donated systems are U.S.-origin because they were bought earlier under FMS, NATO pooling, or bilateral transfers; public trackers and the Forum on the Arms Trade register pledges and deliveries from numerous European states, showing the mix of donated and pledged matériel ^{[5] [6]}.

3. Funding channels: national budgets, FMS contracts, EU funds and loans

Funding has been multi‑threaded: national defence procurement budgets and bilateral FMS contracts finance purchases of new U.S. equipment (the formal route for many European buys) while the European Peace Fund (EPF) and EU budgetary commitments — and mechanisms such as the ERA loan facility referenced by the Kiel Institute — have been used to channel EU-level money into procurement for Ukraine ^{[4] [3]}. The EU also agreed to a large multi‑year aid package (90 billion euros for 2026–27) that overlaps with military and macro-financial support, and member states have used both direct appropriations and procurement contracts to buy replacements for transferred stock ^{[7] [3]}.

4. How U.S. policy nudged Europeans into buying — the incentives and the mechanics

Policy shifts in Washington — including pauses in direct drawdowns and new arrangements where Europeans buy U.S. systems which may then be redirected to Ukraine — moved purchases from Presidential Drawdown Authority to bilateral FMS or commercial orders; analysts and policy centers note the U.S. may prioritize European orders on production lines and that purchases will likely be bilaterally contracted even if coordinated at NATO or EU levels ^{[8] [9]}. This change converts a U.S. supply relationship into one where Europeans shoulder procurement costs up front while preserving transatlantic industrial lines.

5. Political context, tradeoffs and limits of the public record

The shift to European-funded U.S. purchases has political undercurrents: leaders tout European burden‑sharing and strategic autonomy while critics see Washington offloading costs and control; foreign-policy commentators warn Europeans are buying time to build their own capabilities and to keep U.S. engagement through intelligence and approvals ^{[10] [9]}. Public trackers (Kiel, Forum on the Arms Trade, Bruegel) provide robust snapshots — Europe has outspent the U.S. on procurement for Ukraine in some periods and routed billions through defence contracts — but the available reporting does not publish a single, definitive, itemized list of every European purchase of U.S.-origin weapons specifically earmarked for Ukraine, so any catalogue here is drawn from piecemeal public statements, FMS notification tallies and procurement-tracker aggregates cited above ^{[3] [1] [2]}.