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Fact check: What are the known combat losses of the F35 program?
Executive summary
Confirmed, publicly documented combat shootdowns of F‑35s are not supported by the material provided: the only verified combat engagement in the dataset is Dutch F‑35A strikes on Russian drones over Poland in October 2025, while claims that Iran shot down Israeli F‑35s in mid‑2025 are categorically denied by the Israeli military and remain uncorroborated. Reports about F‑35 losses otherwise largely refer to crashes and accidents since the type entered service, with divergent tallies across sources. [1] [2] [3] [4]
1. Headlines that jump: how many crashes versus combat losses?
Public summaries differ sharply on the F‑35’s mishap history. One timeline counted 11 crashes since 2018, framing them as safety concerns and attributing causes from manufacturing defects to pilot error (Anadolu, Jan 29, 2025) [3]. A separate accounting stated 29 crashes over about 17 years of flight hours, but described the destruction count as fewer than ten destroyed airframes and one pilot fatality, noting the fleet totals and cumulative flight hours to contextualize risk (Simple Flying, Nov 11, 2023) [4]. A crowd‑compiled list of incidents exists as well, cataloguing accidents but not distinguishing wartime shootdowns from peacetime crashes (Wikipedia entry) [5]. These sources show agreement that most losses are accidents, not proven combat shootdowns.
2. The Dutch drone engagement: a clear combat action with limits
In early October 2025, Royal Netherlands Air and Space Force F‑35As engaged Russian drones that entered Polish airspace; the Dutch Ministry of Defence released imagery and a marking on an F‑35A indicating a drone “kill,” though officials did not disclose the specific weapon employed (Oct 1–2, 2025) [6] [1]. This incident is significant because it represents a confirmed combat engagement by an F‑35 platform, but it involved unmanned systems rather than manned enemy aircraft. The reporting is contemporaneous and consistent across the Dutch confirmation and subsequent coverage, establishing a verifiable combat action by an F‑35, while leaving open technical details about engagement range, sensors used, and ordnance [1] [6].
3. Iranian claims of shooting down Israeli F‑35s: contested and unverified
Mid‑June 2025 saw Iranian state media claim four Israeli F‑35s were downed; the Israel Defense Forces promptly and firmly rejected this narrative as false. The available reporting reveals a clear contradiction: Tehran’s boast versus the IDF’s categorical denial (Jun 17, 2025) [2]. No independently verified imagery, wreckage, or corroboration in the dataset supports Iran’s assertion. Given the high geopolitical stakes, such claims fit a pattern of adversarial wartime messaging; they cannot be accepted as established fact without corroboration from neutral observers, third‑party imagery, or physical evidence [2].
4. Technical claims about defeating stealth: historical context and method descriptions
Analysts and some reports attribute the alleged Iranian success to a tactic described as similar to a Chinese technique dating to the 1960s: activating low‑probability radar modes only when a stealth target is within closer range to produce a usable return. This method is presented as theoretically plausible to reduce the advantage of stealth platforms at shorter distances, but the dataset contains no independent confirmation that this tactic produced the claimed shootdowns (Jun 19, 2025) [7]. The technical discussion frames a credible avenue for detection under certain conditions, yet it does not by itself substantiate reported combat losses of F‑35s in the field.
5. Reconciling counts: accidents, survivable incidents, and confirmed combat losses
When sorting the figures, the material separates accident/destruction counts (multiple crashes since service entry, varying tallies) from combat evidence (the Dutch drone engagement is a verified combat event; Iranian claims lack corroboration). Sources agree that crash tallies depend on counting methodology—whether damaged-but-repaired jets are included, and whether near‑miss incidents are logged as accidents [3] [4] [5]. The practical takeaway is that most documented F‑35 losses are non‑combat mishaps, while confirmed combat shootdowns of manned F‑35s are absent from the provided dataset.
6. What remains unresolved and what to watch for next
The key open questions are verification and corroboration: independent imagery, wreckage, pilot status reports, or multinational confirmations would be required to upgrade contested claims into established combat losses. Propaganda incentives exist on all sides—states may exaggerate battlefield successes, while targeted forces deny losses to preserve deterrence—so readers should treat unilateral claims skeptically until third‑party verification appears. The most reliable confirmed event in the current material is the Dutch F‑35A engagement with Russian drones in October 2025; all other putative combat shootdowns in the dataset remain unverified or attributable to peacetime accidents [1] [2] [3] [4] [5].