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What specific engagements or red‑flag exercises have tested F-35 versus Gripen performance in electronic warfare and SA preservation?
Executive summary
There is widespread public and trade‑press discussion comparing the Gripen E and F‑35 on electronic warfare (EW) and situational‑awareness (SA) preservation, but available reporting in the provided set documents few — if any — specific head‑to‑head live exercises or red‑flag engagements that explicitly tested Gripen E versus F‑35 EW performance (available sources do not mention a named F‑35 vs Gripen EW red‑flag exercise) [1] [2]. Commentary and analysis pieces emphasize the Gripen’s modern EW suite and the F‑35’s stealth‑combined sensor fusion as competing strengths, citing bids, procurement debates and magazine deep dives rather than publicly released joint test results [1] [3] [4].
1. What public reporting actually shows: commentary and procurement fights, not battle tests
Most of the documents in the set are comparative articles, opinion pieces or procurement‑focused reporting that argue relative strengths — for example, Hush‑Kit’s long “deep dive” frames the Gripen‑E as the F‑35’s unlikely competitor and discusses exotic datalinks and EW features, but it reads as analysis based on design and operational doctrine rather than publishing results from a formal F‑35 vs Gripen red‑flag exercise [1]. Similarly, procurement coverage around Canada’s fighter debate centers on industrial and capability arguments, not release of mutual EW test data [5] [6]. The explicit absence of a named public exercise is notable: available sources do not mention a published F‑35 vs Gripen EW or SA‑preservation test report [1] [5] [2].
2. How analysts frame the capabilities when no public live‑fire comparisons exist
When direct test data are missing, outlets compare architectures and doctrines: Hush‑Kit and other analyses present the Gripen E as optimized for modular EW upgrades, carrier‑style ease of maintenance and strong electronic attack/passive sensor suites, while F‑35 coverage emphasizes low observable design and sensor fusion that boosts SA and limits enemy detection [1] [3] [4]. These pieces often infer how each jet might perform in EW duels — Gripen’s active jamming and upgradeable GaN‑based EW systems versus the F‑35’s stealth that reduces the need to jam — but they do so without citing declassified red‑flag engagement data [3] [4].
3. What proponents highlight about EW and SA preservation
Pro‑Gripen commentary stresses that the Gripen E’s new AESA radar, GaN‑enabled EW suite, IRST and passive sensors give pilots “situational awareness” via multiple sensor modes and offer both defensive and offensive EW options [3] [2]. F‑35 supporters point to stealth plus integrated sensor fusion as a force multiplier for SA preservation — the platform’s design philosophy is to avoid detection rather than out‑jam opponents — an argument reflected in trade‑press comparisons and op‑eds [4] [7].
4. Where the public debate shows political and industrial agendas
Coverage of Canada’s procurement debate reveals clear non‑technical drivers: Saab’s campaign to sell Gripen E included industrial promises and job creation, and F‑35 defenders sought to protect orders, indicating that some public arguments about EW and SA reflect political and industrial agendas rather than fresh test evidence [5] [8]. Opinion pieces and think‑tank posts sometimes amplify capability claims to influence choice, so readers should weigh advocacy context when reporters cite performance assertions [5] [9].
5. What would count as the missing evidence — and why it’s rare to see it publicly
A definitive “red‑flag” test would be a named exercise, declassified after‑action reports, or mutually agreed press releases describing measured EW outcomes (e.g., detection ranges, jamming effectiveness, data‑link resilience). None of the provided sources supplies such an item; Hush‑Kit’s detailed article offers deep technical context but not a published, direct‑engagement test report between Gripen E and F‑35 [1]. Military secrecy, allied interoperability concerns, and proprietary industrial data commonly limit public release of granular EW test results (available sources do not mention classified release or public AARs).
6. Bottom line for readers seeking concrete, comparative data
If you want specific measured outcomes from F‑35 vs Gripen EW or SA preservation engagements, the current set of reporting does not provide them; instead you will find well‑informed analysis, procurement argumentation, and capability descriptions that let experts argue plausible outcomes [1] [3] [4]. For verifiable, exercise‑level evidence you will need either official after‑action reports from participating air forces or peer‑reviewed acquisition testing documents — documents not present in the supplied sources (available sources do not mention those official AARs).