What role do software updates, sensor maintenance, and sustainment contracts play in the total cost of ownership for F-35 compared to Gripen?

1. The headline: sustainment dominates lifecycle budgets

Sustainment — the long‑term logistics, parts, maintenance and software support — typically becomes the largest share of a combat aircraft’s total cost of ownership, with sustainment costs consuming a large portion of program budgets and driving procurement and policy decisions; the F‑35 program’s sustainment line has been a recurring source of concern in GAO reports and media coverage ^{[1] [4]}. Lockheed has argued multi‑year sustainment contracts can reduce per‑jet annual sustainment spend and has proposed multi‑year deals tied to performance guarantees as a route to bring down program sustainment spending ^[2].

2. Software updates: capability growth but also recurring cost

Modern fighters rely on software to add sensors, tactics and weapons, so software updates are both a capability lever and a recurring cost. Saab emphasizes the Gripen’s modular, MIL‑STD‑1553B‑based integration that makes it “programmable” and enables incremental performance upgrades via software, which Saab and some proponents say reduces upgrade cost and complexity ^[3]. For the F‑35, software and logistics ecosystems (historically ALIS, now ODIN and other tools) have required substantial investment and modernization — investments that Lockheed has tied to sustainment contracts and that GAO has scrutinized as part of rising sustainment projections ^{[2] [1]}.

3. Sensors and sensor maintenance: “best sensor dominates” vs. stealth dependency

Gripen’s architecture is presented by Saab as sensor‑fusion built on interoperable buses and external datalinks, with a “best sensor dominates” approach that can lower single‑airframe sensor maintenance dependency and allow distributed sensing ^[3]. The F‑35’s sensor suite and stealth coatings are integral to its performance but increase sustainment tasks: advanced sensors, low‑observable treatments and tightly integrated avionics raise maintenance intensity and specialized depot requirements — factors GAO flagged when analyzing fleet readiness and sustainment cost trends ^{[1] [4]}.

4. Flight hour cost claims — contested but illustrative

Published figures vary widely: one industry/focused outlet reports Gripen E per‑flight‑hour costs around $5,800 versus about $35,000 for the F‑35, and flyaway prices of roughly $85M vs. $100M respectively, presenting a large operational‑cost gulf ^[3]. Independent audit reporting and other media note rising F‑35 sustainment costs and lower-than‑expected readiness that affect flown hours and life‑cycle math, lending credibility to higher F‑35 O&S estimates even as exact comparators and accounting bases differ ^{[1] [4]}. Note: lifecycle calculations depend heavily on assumptions about flight tempo, depot strategy, contract length, and whether industrial‑offsets or national sustainment work are included ^[5].

5. Sustaining contracts as a tool to control or shift costs

Lockheed’s pitch for extra‑long sustainment contracts intends to shift risk, lock in parts purchasing, and modernize logistics software in exchange for multi‑year payment certainty and performance targets; Lockheed estimates potential savings if such deals secure economies of scale across a growing global fleet ^[2]. Critics and auditors, including GAO, have cautioned that sustainment projections are uncertain and that contract structure, oversight, and performance metrics will determine whether those deals actually lower total ownership costs ^{[1] [2]}.

6. Industrial policy and sovereignty: who controls updates and maintenance

Gripen’s sales pitch — including statements that customer nations would control software and have more direct industrial involvement — plays into defence buyers’ desire for sovereignty over updates and sustainment ^{[6] [3]}. The F‑35 program’s multinational sustainment and industrial participation model delivers broad supplier workshares and domestic industrial benefits for some customers, but also links sustainment to U.S. program rules and centralized logistics arrangements that factor into cost and political debates ^{[4] [2]}.

7. What reporting does not settle — limits and open questions

Available sources document divergent claims and programmatic concerns but do not provide a single, apples‑to‑apples total‑cost‑of‑ownership comparison; lifecycle figures depend on scope (flyaway vs. full acquisition vs. sustainment through 2058), fleet size, usage rates and national sustainment choices, and those exact comparative calculations are not provided in the current reporting ^{[5] [1]}. GAO reports and industry proposals clarify the drivers but do not definitively prove one platform is always cheaper over every conceivable lifecycle ^{[1] [2]}.

8. Bottom line for decision‑makers

Policymakers weighing F‑35 versus Gripen must treat software lifecycle, sensor maintenance intensity, and the structure of sustainment contracts as strategic cost levers: modular, open upgrade paths and local sustainment can reduce long‑term O&S risk for buyers, while large, centralized sustainment deals can yield scale savings but concentrate dependency and governance issues ^{[3] [2] [1]}. The public record shows real sustainment cost pressures for the F‑35 and strong marketing claims for Gripen on lower hourly and support burdens, but available sources do not deliver a definitive, universally comparable TCO number ^{[1] [3]}.